Valparaiso University Law Review
Volume 50
Number 2 Winter 2016

pp.419-492

Winter 2016

Permanent States of Exception: A Two-Tiered System of Criminal
Justice Courtesy of the Double Government Wars on Crime, Drugs
& Terror
Thomas Anthony Durkin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Thomas Anthony Durkin, Permanent States of Exception: A Two-Tiered System of Criminal Justice
Courtesy of the Double Government Wars on Crime, Drugs & Terror, 50 Val. U. L. Rev. 419 (2016).
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol50/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University
Law Review by an authorized administrator of
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu.

Durkin: Permanent States of Exception: A Two-Tiered System of Criminal Ju

PERMANENT STATES OF EXCEPTION: A
TWO-TIERED SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
COURTESY OF THE DOUBLE GOVERNMENT
WARS ON CRIME, DRUGS & TERROR
Thomas Anthony Durkin*
I. INTRODUCTION
The November 2014 Valparaiso University Law School Law Review
Symposium National Security:
Up Close and Personal contributed
significantly to the ongoing and necessary national debate on issues
regarding our national security response to 9/11. 1 As such, it was an
honor and privilege to be selected to participate in such an important
discussion. However, as I began my remarks on The Effect of Home-Grown
Terrorism panel by wryly suggesting that perhaps the word “fear” should
have been inserted in the title, I suggest the same here to more accurately
state the question from the vantage point defense lawyers encounter
defending so-called “domestic terrorism cases” in the federal courts in
Chicago and elsewhere in the country. From our firm’s courtroom

Attorney at Law, Durkin Roberts & Grohman, Chicago, Illinois. Distinguished
Practitioner in Residence at the Loyola University Chicago School of Law and Co-Director
of its National Security and Civil Rights Program. Senior Research Fellow, Center on
National Security, Fordham University School of Law. B.A., University of Notre Dame, 1968;
J.D., University of San Francisco School of Law, 1973. Graduate Student At Large and
Returning Scholar, University of Chicago, 2009 to the present. Law Clerk to the Honorable
James Parsons, U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois; Assistant United States
Attorney, Northern District of Illinois, 1978 to 1984; Fellow of the American College of Trial
Lawyers and one of five lawyers selected nation-wide to be a participant in the John Adams
Project, a joint collaboration of the American Civil Liberties Union and the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers to provide civilian counsel in the case of United
States v. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed before the Military Commissions Trial Judiciary,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. See http://www.durkinroberts.com [http://perma.cc/9ATKD32R]. This Article would not have been possible without the research and assistance of
Robin V. Waters, an Associate Attorney at Durkin Roberts & Grohman and Maud O. Jansen,
a summer law clerk and student at the University of Chicago.
1
Symposium, National Security: Up Close and Personal, 50 VAL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2016). The serious scholarship also addressing this debate is voluminous. For but a few
examples, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
AN AGE OF TERRORISM 2–3 (2006); DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE
CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 1–2 (2002);
LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER, POLITICS, AND LIBERTY 4–5
(2008); DAVID JENKINS, AMANDA JACOBSEN & ANDERS HENRIKSEN, THE LONG DECADE: HOW
9/11 CHANGED THE LAW 3–4 (2014); JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTÁNAMO AND THE ABUSE OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 3 (2006); ANICETO MASFERRER, POST 9/11 AND THE STATE OF
PERMANENT LEGAL EMERGENCY: SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN COUNTERING TERRORISM
1 (2012).
*
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vantage point, it is the effect of the fear of homegrown terrorism that seems
to be prevailing, surely not homegrown terrorism itself.2
However, fear is hardly something new to federal criminal
practitioners. As I have argued elsewhere, fear driven war rhetoric
legislation has already caused considerable damage to procedural due
process rights by gradual judicial acquiescence in federal criminal
prosecutions, and civil liberties in general, well in advance of 9/11. 3 Thus,
I would like to build on this theme and argue that a continuous thread of
gradual judicial acquiescence to fear generated by purported national
emergencies—or if you will, “states of exception”—can be seen to weave
its way through both the War on Crime and the War on Drugs. This
gradual judicial acquiescence, albeit in the face of congressional legislation
designed to thwart grave danger perceived to be destroying our inner
cities, greased the skids, so to speak, for continued deference to the
executive branch’s far more legitimate emergency measures in response
to the events of 9/11. When it now comes to our Symposium topic of
“homegrown” national security cases in the federal criminal courts, it is
somewhat disingenuous not to acknowledge that a growing two-tiered
system of procedural due process is becoming the everyday reality.
In doing so, a careful analysis of the insightful scholarship of Professor
Michael J. Glennon of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts
with respect to his recent article and book on national security and double

See also JOHN MUELLER, TERRORISM SINCE 9/11: THE AMERICAN CASES 1 (2015). Indeed,
as Professor Mueller points out a careful analysis of the actual threat terrorism poses reveals
that an American has a one in 3.5 million chance of perishing at the hands of a terrorist. Id.
at 30. To contextualize this figure with approximations, the risk of becoming a victim of
homicide is one in 22,000; the risk of being killed in an automobile accident is one in 8000;
and the risk of dying from cancer is one in 500. Obviously, the fear of such an attack far
outweighs the actual risk, which only brings the urgency to analyze our national security
choices into greater focus. MUELLER, supra note 2, at 22.
3
See Thomas A. Durkin, Apocalyptic War Rhetoric: Drugs, Narco-Terrorism, and a Federal
Court Nightmare From Here to Guantanamo, 2 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 257, 258–59
(2012) (discussing the fear politicians face about the way the public perceives their decisions
made in regard to the war on terror); see also JAY FELDMAN, MANUFACTURING HYSTERIA: A
HISTORY OF SCAPEGOATING, SURVEILLANCE, AND SECRECY IN MODERN AMERICA xvii (2011)
(reviewing fear driven rhetoric in World War I). The Pen American Center opined that:
Precisely because it is legitimized via fear one can claim that “the war
against terror” is a greater danger to democracy than terrorism
itself . . . We can perhaps say, along with the philosopher Giorgio
Agamben that we live today in a permanent state of emergency, where
the reference to serious dangers almost works like a trump card—and
the card trumps recognized democratic rights.
Brief of Amicus Curiae Pen American Center in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction and in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 21, ACLU v. Clapper, 2013
WL 5221583 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13 Civ. 3994).
2
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government will become a cornerstone. 4 It was Professor Glennon’s
observations on the theme of “double government” that confirmed my
own courtroom intuition and growing suspicion that this two-tiered
system of procedural due process was developing right before my eyes.5
Implicit in this entire analysis and critical to any assessment of our
Symposium’s national security conversation, is the very question of the
judiciary’s ability to uphold the Constitution and rule of law. Rather than
trying to shoehorn these emergencies into the rule of law, it will be argued
that judges would do the country a far better service by conceding that
they cannot do their job, in some instances involving domestic national
security prosecutions, while the country goes through these emergencies
or states of exception.6 A singular, but concrete example of a consequence
of this “state of exception,” in the contextual setting of a traditional Fourth
Amendment challenge in Franks v. Delaware to a search warrant
authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) recently
decided in the widely publicized Seventh Circuit interlocutory opinion in
the case of United States v. Daoud, will be analyzed.7 This analysis will offer
an insight into how a routine procedural due process Fourth Amendment
challenge to search warrants can literally be read out of play in a FISA
search warrant, based solely upon the untested certification of the
Attorney General that national security will be harmed by the disclosure
of the search warrant materials to the defense. Of particular note will be
Judge Ilana Diamond Rovner’s forthright concurring opinion in Daoud
that concedes that Franks cannot be squared with FISA.8

See Michael J. Glennon, National Security and Double Government, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J.
1, 1 (2014) (introducing the “double government” theory); see also MICHAEL J. GLENNON,
NATIONAL SECURITY AND DOUBLE GOVERNMENT 4 (Oxford Univ. Press 2015) (explaining the
rational actor model and the government politics model and introducing the idea that neither
of these models are ideal in addressing national security issues).
5
Glennon’s “double government” theme has also been referred to by other
commentators as “the shadows.”
TOM ENGELHARDT, SHADOW GOVERNMENT:
SURVEILLANCE, SECRET WARS, AND A GLOBAL SECURITY STATE IN A SINGLE-SUPERPOWER
WORLD 17–18 (2014); SCOTT HORTON, LORDS OF SECRECY: THE NATIONAL SECURITY ELITE AND
AMERICA’S STEALTH WARFARE 87 (2015).
6
This insight has been suggested by Professor David Dyzenhaus in his thoughtful work,
The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency. While speaking in the context of the
U.K.’s Emergency Act of 1937, Dyzenhaus admits that it could be the case that courts are no
longer capable of doing their job of “maintaining the integrity of the legal order” DAVID
DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 33 (2006).
7
See United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479, 483–84 (7th Cir. 2014) (analyzing the decision
made in Franks and its applicability in the FISA context case); see also Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154, 171–73 (1978).
8
See Daoud, 755 F.3d at 486–87 (describing why Franks cannot operate under the FISA
context).
4
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Finally, going a step further than Professor Glennon, as well as
running the risk of overstepping my trial lawyer area of expertise by
delving into the fields of legal and political theory, the proposition will be
briefly advanced if this two-tiered system of justice might well be logically
inherent in the very structure of our constitutional democracy. This
expansion can only happen if one is willing to step outside the normal
rhetoric of current national security case law which, at best, often pays
only lip service to the rule of law, and dares to engage both the work of
Carl Schmitt, Clinton Rossiter, Georgio Agamben, and other political and
legal theorists with respect to their scholarly views on Schmitt’s famous
premise that “[s]overeign is he who decides on the exception.” 9
This exercise necessarily entails a brief exploration into the
relationship of the “state of exception” to sovereignty, and raises the
difficult and ambiguous constitutional question implicit in Professor
Glennon’s double government theory as to the current locus of
sovereignty in the United States insofar as declaring, implementing, and
continuing our global war on terror that appears to have no realistic end
in sight. The serious implications of the answer to this question, which by
definition necessarily spills over into national security prosecutions in the
federal courts, presents for Glennon nothing less than an question as to
the very type of government with which we shall be left, which, I suggest,
also must include whether we truly wish to continue to default our way
into a two-tiered system of criminal justice in the federal courts.
The same question was also raised, with a bit of a twist, at an earlier
national security symposium in 2006 at the University of Georgia by Texas
Law Professor Sanford Levinson. 10 In a thought provoking symposium
article analyzing the constitutional ramifications of Schmitt’s “state of
exception” as it pertains to the future of our overall constitutional
democracy, Professor Levinson poignantly asked whether it might be
possible to have “an [a]dult [c]onversation” about Schmitt and this
complex sovereignty problem so that an intelligent decision might be
made as to the very kind of political order in which we wish to live. 11
Whether that conversation has or can be had is anyone’s guess. However,
some seven years later, it is respectfully suggested that Professor
Levinson’s “adult conversation” appears to go on, if at all, only among
academic elites, as it seems conspicuously absent in most national security

CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY xviii, 5 (George Schwab trans., 2005).
10
See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 GA. L.
REV. 699, 701–02 (2006) (addressing the national security interests and introduction to
morality).
11
See id. at 748–50.
9
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opinions of the judiciary, the halls of Congress, the White House, or for
that matter, among lawyers and most certainly not in very many law
schools. It is the hope that this Article might, in some small way, continue
to spur such an adult conversation, as the constitutional stakes both
Glennon and Levinson raise are nothing less than foundational.
II. FEDERAL DOMESTIC NATIONAL SECURITY PROSECUTIONS & GLENNON’S
DOUBLE GOVERNMENT REVELATIONS
According to a July 2014 publication co-authored by the Columbia
Law School Human Rights Institute and Human Rights Watch, between
2002 and 2011, almost 500 individuals were convicted of terrorism, or
terrorism-related offenses in the United States, and the federal
government charged an average of about forty individuals every year. 12
As also noted by the report, these post-9/11 terrorism cases are
disconcerting for the changes, practices, and procedures they have
brought to the federal system:
Terrorism cases in the US since September 11, 2001[,] have
raised serious fair trial concerns. This is largely due to
investigative and detention tactics that occur prior to trial
including prolonged solitary confinement during pretrial
detention, as well as procedural impediments imposed by
the US Congress or courts; use of prejudicial evidence
such as evidence obtained through coercion; classified
evidence obtained by warrantless wiretaps that cannot be
fairly contested; and inflammatory evidence, including
evidence about terrorism in non-terrorism cases that
unfairly plays on jurors’ fears.13
I hardly needed Columbia or Human Rights Watch to tell me things
were out of whack in national security prosecutions in the federal courts.
My first suspicion that something was seriously remiss in criminal
prosecutions in the name of national security began in Guantanamo Bay.
A day or two before my client, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and his four coconspirators—including
alleged
master-mind
Khalid
Sheikh
Mohammed—were arraigned in the capital conspiracy case in the Military
Commissions for plotting the 9/11 attacks, several civilian defense
counsels and I were standing in line outside a trailer office waiting to
Illusion of Justice: Human Rights Abuses in U.S. Terrorism Prosecutions, COLUM. L. SCH.
HUM. RTS. INST. & HUM. RTS. WATCH 13 (July 21, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/reports/
2014/07/21/illusion-justice-0 [http://perma.cc/E8C7-4GYR].
13
Id. at 76.
12
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obtain credentials.14 We struck up a conversation with one or two of the
prosecutors from the Office of Military Commissions (“OMC”), but the
prosecutors seemed unwilling or unable to answer even the most basic
questions about the case. In the course of the next few days, this pattern
of unwillingness or inability to answer typical questions that prosecutors
and defense counsel routinely share among themselves struck me as odd,
but I dismissed it due to the seriousness of the case, OMC hierarchy, and
the massive world-wide media attention it was attracting.15
Additionally, the same sense of uneasiness and prosecutorial doublespeak began to raise its head in the domestic terrorism cases in which we
became involved in the federal court in Chicago. Prosecutors from the
Chicago U.S. Attorney’s Office, with whom we work on a regular basis
and share a significant amount of trust lawyer-to-lawyer, began reacting
the same way as the guys in the credential line in the Guantanamo Military
Commissions. Rudimentary questions that would readily be answered in
regular federal criminal prosecutions would more and more be met with
the answer: “Not sure, I’ll have to get back to you.” Over time, it
gradually became clear to us that either the local line-assistant prosecutors
On January 21, 2010, Susan L. Crawford, the Convening Authority for the Military
Commissions, dismissed all the charges. See Letter from Susan J. Crawford, Convening
Authority for Military Commissions, Regarding the Direction of the Convening Authority
(Jan. 21, 2010) (reporting all charges against the named defendants are withdrawn and
dismissed without prejudice). The group was then indicted in the Southern District of New
York in United States v. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. See Indictment, United States v. Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed, (S14) 93-CR-180 (KTD). The case was subsequently brought back to the
Military Commission in Guantanamo. See Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review
Tribunal Hearing at 1, United States v. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, (S14) 93-CR-180 (KTD)
(2007) (ISN No. 10013).
15
See, e.g., Sylvain Cypel, Le “Cerveau” Présumé du 11 Septembre Veut Mourir En Martyr
[The presumed “brains” of 9/11 wants to die a martyr], LE MONDE (June 6, 2008, 11:35 AM),
http://www.lemonde/fr/elections-americaines/article/2008/06/06/le-cerveau-presumedu-11-septembre-veut-mourir-en-martyr_1054552_829254.html [http://perma.cc/2PRWZ96X] (demonstrating the world-wide media attention); William Glaberson, 9/11 Suspects
Arraigned at Guantánamo Hearing, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2008), http://nytimes.com/
2008/06/05/washington/05cnd-gitmo.html [http://perma.cc/256C-8328] (summarizing
imprisonment and subsequent arraignment of the five detainees); Louise Radnofsky &
Allegra Stratton, Profiles: Guantánamo Trial, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2008), http://www.the
guardian.com/world/2008/jun/05/alqaida.guantanamo1 [http://perma.cc/TZN6-XZKL]
(profiling the five men charged in connection with the 9/11 attacks); Carol Rosenberg,
Alleged 9/11 Architect:
Martyr Me, MIAMI HERALD (June 6, 2008),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/guantanamo/
article1929229.html [http://perma.cc/L7NV-3U7H] (illustrating the events of the hearing
where five accused 9/11 co-conspirators each independently rejected free American
lawyers); Josh White, 9/11 Architect Tells Court He Hopes for Martyrdom, WASH. POST (June 6,
2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/05/AR200806
0500305.html [http://perma.cc/TV3V-NB56] (discussing the position of Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed in regard to the allegation of his involvement with the 9/11 attacks).
14
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themselves did not know the answers to the questions, or even if they did,
they were not permitted to respond to questions without permission.
Clearly something significantly different was happening in these cases. It
was not until reading Glennon’s double government article, National
Security and Double Government, that I finally began making sense out of
my increasing uneasiness over what was happening with respect to who
was actually running these prosecutions. In the article’s first page
abstract, Professor Glennon caught my attention. As he bluntly stated:
The public believes that the constitutionally-established
institutions control national security policy, but that view
is mistaken. Judicial review is negligible; congressional
oversight is dysfunctional; and presidential control is
nominal.
Absent a more informed and engaged
electorate, little possibility exists for restoring
accountability in the formulation and execution of
national security policy.16
It suddenly occurred to me that if presidential control over national
security policy was nominal, why should anyone think that the
prosecutorial control by the Chicago U.S. Attorney’s Office was any
different? In posing the question as to why national security policy would
remain constant through the Obama Administration, notwithstanding the
newly elected President’s forceful criticism on the campaign trail, Glennon
suggests that “[a] disquieting answer is provided by the theory that
Walter Bagehot suggested in 1867 to explain the evolution of the English
Constitution.”17
Citing Bagehot’s classic, The English Constitution,
Glennon lays out Bagehot’s comparison between Britain’s “‘dignified’
institutions” versus its “efficient” organizations that together comprised a
“disguised republic.”18 As Glennon puts it, Bagehot’s disguised republic
“obscures the massive shift in power that has occurred, which if widely

Glennon, supra note 4, at 1–2. With the exception of one example of recent disclosure
of dysfunctional congressional oversight, consider the congressional oversight of U.S. drone
strikes, where the full legal basis for those strikes is withheld from the public. See Richard
Weir, Accountability on Drones Continues to Fall Short, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND. (Aug. 12, 2015),
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/accountability-drones-continues-fallshort [https://perma.cc/7CD7-D7HD] (“Currently, congressional committees tasked with
oversight of the program do not even have access to all of the administration’s
interpretations of relevant law. Since 2010, members of the Senate intelligence committee
have requested the release of all the Office of Legal Counsel’s opinions to targeted killing
operations. Only four—of what is believed to be at least nine opinions—have been shared.”).
17
Glennon, supra note 4, at 10.
18
Id. at 11–12.
16
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understood would create a crisis in public confidence.” 19 In short,
Glennon explained that it is the latter “‘efficient’ institutions” (the House
of Commons, the Cabinet, and the Prime Minister) that Bagehot suggested
did the real work of governing—not the “‘dignified’ institutions” (the
monarchy and the House of Lords).20 Turning to the United States,
Glennon acknowledges that as was the case in the early days of Britain’s
monarchy, power also originally lay in the hands of America’s “‘dignified’
institutions”—the President, Congress, and the courts.21 While many
Americans may well still believe these dignified institutions are the seat
of governmental power, Glennon posits—consistent with our courtroom
experience—that insofar as national security decisions are concerned, the
public is sadly mistaken.22 Justifying his sense of how disquieting things
have become, Glennon puts things rather bluntly again:
[W]hen it comes to defining and protecting national
security . . . America’s efficient institution makes most of
the key decisions concerning national security, removed
from public view and from the constitutional restrictions
that check America’s dignified institutions.23
Glennon straightforwardly claims that the United States “moved beyond
a mere imperial presidency to a bifurcated system—a structure of double
government—in which even the President now exercises little substantive
control over the overall direction of U.S. national security policy.” 24
Glennon advances the Bagehot analogy by describing America’s
“dignified” institutions as “Madisonian[s]” while calling the United States
“efficient” institutions as “Trumanite[s].”25 These he describes as a
“network of several hundred high-level military, intelligence, diplomatic,
and law enforcement officials within the Executive Branch who are
responsible for national security policymaking.”26 Giving President
Id. at 11.
See id. at 10–11 (asserting a difference between “‘dignified’ institutions” and “‘efficient’
institutions” as it pertains to governing). Glennon points out that Bagehot explained that the
Monarchy and House of Lords were “dignified” in that they provide a link to the past, excite
the public imagination, and exercise a hold on the public mind by evoking the grandeur of
past ages through theatrical show, pomp, and historical symbolism. Id.
21
See id. at 12 (discussing the distribution of power in the early United States as compared
to early Britain).
22
See Glennon, supra note 9, at 12 (illustrating the skewed viewpoint among Americans
relating to national security).
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
See id. at 17–18 (categorizing the differing approaches and viewpoints as “Madisonian”
and “Trumanite”).
26
Id. at 18.
19
20
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Truman this appellation is no accident.27
Glennon explains in
considerable historical detail Truman’s founding role in the creation of the
modern American national security state, and the passage of the historic
National Security Act of 1947 (“the Act”).28 As Glennon explains further,
it is the Act that “unified the military under a new Secretary of Defense,
set up the CIA, created the modern Joint Chiefs of Staff, and established
the National Security Council . . . .”29 The Act also established the
National Security Agency.30 Citing a landmark 2011 Washington Post
study of the Act’s growth, Glennon illustrates that there are now at least
forty-six federal departments and agencies engaged in national security
work with millions of employees and a total annual budget outlay of
around $1 trillion.31
Importantly, Glennon goes on to discuss how this double government
was not a diabolical conspiracy, but instead, part of the same structural
inheritance from the British of our adopted form of a constitutional
republic.32 Differing from Bagehot, however, Glennon demonstrates that
our double government evolved in plain sight and is more structural than
purposeful.33 Glennon’s point, as to the structure, is worth quoting in full:
Nonetheless, in the United States today, as in Bagehot’s
Britain, “[m]ost do indeed vaguely know that there are
See id. (explaining how President Truman is largely responsible for creating the United
States’ “‘efficient’ national security apparatus”).
28
See Glennon, supra note 9, at 19–21 (describing Truman’s role in the origin of the efficient
security state).
29
Id. at 18.
30
Id.
31
See id. at 22 (accounting for the number of federal departments and agencies in the
United States and the budget that accompanies national security work). Considerable
scholarship, far beyond the scope of this Article, has been devoted to the National Security
Act of 1947 and its ramifications. However, a basic understanding of the Act, its impact on
present day America and our national security apparatus in general, is essential in
attempting to grasp the national security world in which we find ourselves today even
insofar as prosecutions in the name of national security are concerned. See generally MICHAEL
J. HOGAN, A CROSS OF IRON: HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
STATE, 1945–1954 65 (1998) (indicating that the National Security Act of 1947 “established the
modern mechanisms of the national security state”); IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW
DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 8–10 (2013) (examining the New Deal and analyzing the
results of illiberal alliances); JOHN LUKACS, THE LEGACY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 189–91
(2010) (analyzing post-World War II America); JAMES T. SPARROW, WARFARE STATE: WORLD
WAR II AMERICANS AND THE AGE OF BIG GOVERNMENT 42–43 (2011) (discussing Roosevelt’s
administration, the New Deal, and the building of “an arsenal of democracy”).
32
See Glennon, supra note 4, at 45 (explaining that, as in Bagehot’s Britain, there are
institutions involved in the governance of the United States that were not established by the
constitution).
33
See id. at 45–46 (noting that the evolution of America’s double government has not been
purposeful, but a response to society’s needs).
27
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some other institutions” involved in governance besides
those established by the Constitution. But the popular
conception of an “invisible government,” “state within,”
or “national security state” is off the mark. The existence
of the Trumanite network is no secret. The network’s
emergence has not been the result of an enormous,
nefarious conspiracy conceived to displace constitutional
government. The emergence of the Trumanite network
has not been purposeful. America’s dual national
security framework has evolved gradually in response to
incentives woven into the system’s structure as that
structure has reacted to society’s felt needs. Yet, as a
whole, Americans still do not recognize the extent to
which Madisonian institutions have come to formulate
national security policy in form more than in substance.34
As part and parcel of these structural incentives, Glennon goes on in a
section entitled “The Reality of Madisonian Weakness” to explain quite
cogently how while it appears that the President, Congress, and the courts
set national security policy, “in reality their role is minimal.” 35 Taking
issue with Harvard Professor Jack Goldsmith’s proposition that “[t]he
main virtue of the [checks and balances] system lies in its ability to selfcorrect[,]” Glennon says instead that all three branches “exercise
decisional authority more in form than in substance.” 36 Sadly, Glennon’s
conclusion, rather than Goldsmith’s, seems closer to reality from our
courtroom experience; but it would be foolhardy to question Professor
Goldsmith’s prolific and serious scholarly contributions to the national
security debate, albeit from his quite different perspective of government
service.37
Id.
Id. at 46.
36
Id. at 46 n.242.
37
See generally JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 9–11 (2007) (narrating Smith’s experiences as the Head of the
Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Customary International Law and Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110
HARV. L. REV. 815, 816–17 (1997) (challenging the modern position that customary
international law has the status of federal common law); Jack Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy
and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1667, 1668–69 (2003) (examining forms of criticism
targeted at the United States regarding its failure to take affirmative action to help other
nations, and critiquing the cosmopolitan duty argument); Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating
International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89 (2003) (arguing that the current
organization of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) is unacceptable and laying out the
mechanism that make ICC futile and perverse); Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs
Preemption, 200 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 176–77 (2001) (analyzing issues concerning statutory
34
35
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Certainly if Glennon’s theory of double government is correct, and the
President himself now exercises little substantive control over the overall
direction of national security policy, it is understandable why local
prosecutors from the U.S. Attorney’s Offices, under the umbrella of his
Department of Justice, were incapable of exercising control over domestic
national security prosecutions.38 Over time, and the more domestic
national security cases we took on,39 this became so clear to us that we
took the liberty to inform District Court trial judges that we would no
longer call the local U.S. Attorney’s Office and its Assistants “the
government.”40 Instead, we would hereafter simply refer to them in our
pleadings as “the prosecutors.”
While, of course, some of this banter was tongue-in-cheek courtroom
theatrics, there may be more to this observation than meets the eye. First
and foremost, it is our experience that very few people involved in the
practice of federal criminal law—and this might well include many
judges—are aware that the National Security Division of the Department
of Justice (“NSD”) does not report to the Assistant Attorney General of the
Criminal Division, as would occur in every other federal criminal
prosecution.41 It is of no small consequence to this discussion that the
Department of Justice Counterterrorism and Counterespionage Sections
were taken out of the Criminal Division chain of command and merged
into a newly created National Security Division as part of the USA

foreign affairs preemption and arguing that an interpretive canon favoring federal foreign
affairs interests is warranted).
38
Glennon, supra note 9, at 12 (“The United States has, in short, moved beyond a mere
imperial presidency to a bifurcated system—a structure of double government—in which
even the President now exercises little substantive control over the overall direction of U.S.
national security policy.”).
39
To date, our firm has been involved in the following national security or “domestic
terrorism” cases in federal district courts since 9/11: United States v. Abdelhaleem Ashqar,
03-CR-978 (N.D. Ill. 2005); United States v. Raja Lahrasib Khan, 10-CR-240 (N.D. Ill. 2012);
United States v. Basaaly Moalin, 10-CR-4246 (S.D. Cal. 2013); United States v. Shaker Masri,
10-CR-655 (N.D. Ill. 2012); United States v. Adel Daoud, 12-CR-723 (N.D. Ill. 2014); United
States v. Mohammed Khan, 14-CR-564 (N.D. Ill. 2012). Notable Cases, DURKIN ROBERTS &
GROHMAN,
http://www.durkinroberts.com/notable-cases/
[http://perma.cc/5NBEKYUH].
40
Defendant’s Consolidated Reply in Support of His Pretrial Motions, United States v.
Adel Daoud, 12-CR-723, 2014 WL 321384 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
41
See U.S. Dep’t of Just., National Security Division Progress Report, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
NAT’L SECURITY DIVISION 2–3 (Apr. 2008), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
nsd/legacy/2014/07/23/nsd-progress-rpt-2008.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XHJ9-YAVR]
(showing the Justice Department National Security Structure after the creation of the
National Security Division).
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PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2006.42 This Act
created the Senate confirmation position of Assistant Attorney General
(“AAG”) for National Security. 43 This chain of command bypasses the
AAG of the Criminal Division, and requires the approval of the Director
of National Intelligence (“DNI”) before the Presidential recommendation
for appointment.44
Further, also hidden in Glennon’s plain sight, every national security
or domestic terrorism prosecution must be approved and supervised by the
same AAG of the National Security Division who was approved by the
DNI.45 The AAG remains as a “supervisory authority over the conduct of
the case from its inception until its conclusion, including appeal.” 46 The
U.S. Attorneys’ manual also mandates that line assistants must receive
“express authorization of the National Security Division [(“NSD”)] or
higher authority” to institute a case involving national security, and the
NSD must be consulted:
[B]efore an arrest is made, a search warrant is obtained, a
grand jury investigation is commenced, immunity is
offered, an indictment is presented, an information filed,
or a civil injunctive action is filed, a prosecution is
declined, a count is dismissed, a sentencing commitment
See id. (depicting the changes to the Justice Department National Security Structure as
part of USA PATRIOT Act, which eliminated the counterespionage and counterterrorism
sections).
43
See id. at 2 (noting that Congress established the National Security Division as part of
the PATRIOT Act, which is led by the Assistant Attorney General for National Security).
44
See Exec. Order No. 12333(1.1)(d)(2), 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981),
https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/eo12333.html#2.5
[https://perma.cc/PDV9-HZXR]
(explaining the approval process). The Executive Order states:
The relevant department head shall consult with the Director [of
National Security] before appointing an individual to fill a vacancy or
recommending to the President an individual be nominated to fill a
vacancy in any of the following positions: the Under Secretary for
Defense for Intelligence; the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency; uniformed heads of the intelligence elements of the Army, the
Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps above the rank of Major
General or Rear Admiral; the Assistant Commandant of the Coast
Guard for Intelligence; and the Assistant Attorney General for National
Security.
Id. (emphasis added).
45
See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-90.100,
http://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-90000-national-security [https://perma.cc/J5PU76RS] (“[A]ll criminal cases relating to activities directed against the national security, as well
as collateral offenses such as perjury that arise out of such activities, are to be supervised by
the Assistant Attorney General (AAG), National Security Division.”) (internal citations
omitted).
46
Id.
42
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or other disposition is made, or an adverse ruling or
decision is appealed . . . .47
In short, this laundry list constitutes nearly every conceivable
prosecutorial decision normally made by the U.S. Attorney’s Office. 48
Thus, it may not necessarily be mere tongue-in-cheek criticism to suggest
that local line assistant federal prosecutors assigned to a national security
case are completely beholden to the AGG and the NSD, and indirectly the
DNI, when it comes to the approval of every aspect of a domestic national
security prosecution. This is of no small moment on a number of levels.
First and foremost, major city U.S. Attorney’s Offices such as the Southern
and Eastern Districts of New York (New York City and Brooklyn), the
Central District of California (Los Angeles) and the Northern District of
Illinois (Chicago), have always prided themselves as being largely
independent of the Department of Justice and Glennon’s bureaucrats.
Among practitioners, these offices are considered the premier offices in
the country; and due to the volume and sophistication of the prosecutions,
deservedly receive a considerable amount of respect and deference both
from Washington and the judges in the districts in which they practice.
This independence, respect, and deference cuts a number of ways, but
is critical to the overall daily operation of the federal criminal justice
system. Defense lawyers and prosecutors necessarily must come to trust
each other—or at least those lawyers considered trustworthy on both
sides.49 The everyday operation of the system requires that a relatively
free flow of information exists between the parties. Plea agreements
would come to a standstill if discovery cannot be readily produced and a
prosecutor’s word would be taken at face value regarding what else might
be involved in the case.50 Likewise, no agreement to cooperate could ever
exist if the defense lawyer’s assessment of the credibility of the client or
his or her willingness to cooperate could not be taken at face value.51
Id. at 9-90.020. Assistants must also consult with the Counterintelligence and Export
Control Section (“CES”) of the National Security Division, in cases involving classified
information (governed by the Classified Information Procedures Act). Id.
48
See id.
49
Unfortunately, trustworthiness is not a universal trait with violators on both sides of
the equation. Nevertheless, like every good prosecutor comes to learn which defense
lawyers can be trusted, the same is true on the defense side. Nor is this trustworthiness a
sign of weakness, something some defense lawyers regrettably confuse with the ability to
defend a client zealously.
50
See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ethics and Plea Bargaining: What’s Discovery Got to Do With It?, 23
CRIM. JUST. 28, 30 (2008) (advocating for “open file” discovery and explaining that such
discovery policies would result in guilty pleas being entered into earlier).
51
The entire issue of cooperation with the government raises the hackles of some defense
lawyers who pride themselves as never representing “cooperators.” In the author’s
47
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This same everyday level of trust necessarily comes to exist between
the lawyers and the court. For many of the same reasons that trust comes
to exist between the lawyers, judges likewise need to rely upon the word
of the lawyers before them. Just like a prosecutor must rely on the word
of a defense lawyer that he or she wants to resolve the case without the
need for a trial, judges need to be able to rely upon the word of the lawyers
for each party whether a plea or trial is likely, what the issues are in the
case, how long the case will take, that witnesses are being put on without
the subornation of perjury and the like. The everyday functioning of the
system requires that and more. While many defense lawyers would claim,
with reasonable cause, that most federal judges too often rely upon the
word of the government prosecutors in any kind of case, it is submitted
that this cynicism is becoming well founded in cases brought in the name
of national security. One reason for this problem may lie in an issue
Glennon mentions early in his article while addressing the Obama
Administration’s approach to multiple national security issues as being
essentially the same approach as the Bush Administration, including the
Bush Administration’s CIA programs and operations.52 In reciting these
similarities, Glennon notes that while his article only considers national
security policy, it is important to understand that “elements of national
security policy bear directly upon U.S. foreign policy generally and,
indeed, upon domestic policy.” 53 Glennon labels what he calls the
“Bush/Obama view” and suggests this view considers “homeland
experience, however, these lawyers are either good liars or always have a close associate to
whom they can quickly refer the many clients in whose interest it is to cooperate. Regardless,
a considerable portion of the everyday practice of federal criminal law requires discussions
back and forth between the defense lawyer and prosecutor over what is commonly known
as a “proffer.” A proffer, short for “proffer of testimony,” can be done either directly by the
client pursuant to a “proffer letter” issued by the prosecutor offering a limited form of
immunity; or through what is known as an “attorney proffer” where the defense attorney
tells the prosecutor what the client would say if he or she were to testify. The latter cannot
be used in any fashion against the client, unlike the limited immunity offered in a proffer
letter whose limited immunity is more often swallowed by the exceptions. As a result,
experienced defense practitioners usually only permit attorney proffers with respect to any
client that may still wish to proceed to trial. This process, therefore, requires considerable
give and take between lawyers.
52
See Glennon, supra note 4, at 2–4 (listing the many issues the Bush Administration
practiced and the Obama Administration continues to practice: sending terrorism suspects
overseas for detention and interrogation; claiming the power to hold American citizens
accused of terrorism without trial in military confinement; insisting that the President
decides whether an accused terrorist will be tried by a civilian court or military tribunal;
keeping the military prison at Guantanamo Bay open; arguing that detainees cannot
challenge the conditions of their confinement; restricting detainees’ access to counsel;
resisting efforts to extend the right of habeas corpus to other off-shore prisons; arguing that
detainees cannot invoke the Geneva Convention).
53
Id. at 2 n.2.
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security [as] the be-all and end-all of grand [foreign policy] strategy” that
“required maintaining ‘the security apparatus that supported drone
attacks on Al Qaeda targets’ in countries such as Yemen, which in turn has
shaped U.S. engagement in the Middle East and the muted U.S. response
to the Arab Spring.”54
Blurring the distinctions between modern national security, foreign
policy and domestic policy from the idea of national security being more
or less an issue belonging to the sphere of the military to a broader
strategic concept has been traced to the post-World War II issue of
obtaining “freedom from foreign dictation.”55 This evolution has been
attributed to a variety of causes, including the introduction of “total war”
brought about by the two World Wars of the Twentieth Century, along
with the complete mobilization of the citizenry for manpower which, in
turn, could be said to also blur the distinction between “the battle front
and the home front, as well as between combatants and noncombatants.”56 As such, the idea of “total war” may well have been
captured best shortly after World War II by President Truman in his
memoirs, which also shines considerable light on the reasons behind
pushing for the creation of the National Security Act of 1947, and perhaps,
his comfort level with the decision to drop the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki:
[W]e live in an age when . . . there are no longer sharp
distinctions between combatants and noncombatants,
between military targets and the sanctuary of civilian
areas. Nor can we separate the economic facts from the
problems
of
defense
and
security.
[The]
President . . . must be able to act at all times to meet any
sudden threat to the nation’s security.57
Here, it appears, Glennon, and commentators such as Gross and Ní
Aoláin, get to the very nub of the problem created by the peculiarities of
our modern global war on terror, national security emergencies and the
current confusion that gets put in the lap of District Court Judges when it
comes to these domestic national security cases. While it is rather obvious
that both the War on Crime and the War on Drugs had political overtones
driven by thinly disguised “tough on crime” emergency-like
demagoguery, it was one thing for the courts to stand up and be counted
Id.
OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN THE TIME OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 215 (2006).
56
Id. at 216.
57
Id. at 217.
54
55
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on every now and then to apply traditional Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, or Eighth
Amendment issues in that setting. Certainly, better late than never, the
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Booker declared the mandatory
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional, which is a classic example of
some judicial backbone in this regard.58
When it comes to a global war on terror, however, and
notwithstanding several Supreme Court decisions against the government
in the context of Guantanamo, government losses are few and far between
in the domestic courtroom realm.59 While it may well be one thing to
stand up every now and then to executive and congressional
demagoguery over more traditional criminal prosecutions involving
drugs or street crime, it seems rather too much to expect that judges
would, or even perhaps should, be expected to do the same thing in the
context of something as dire as the very security of the homeland,
something inextricably mixed up in our minds with foreign policy and
traditional concepts of war, military might, and existential threats, real or
imagined. This concept is no doubt frothy stuff, and the conflation and
confusion of fear generated issues—existential or otherwise—is good
fodder for demagoguery over “national security,” which seems to have
succeeded.
III. A CASE STUDY FOR A TWO-TIERED SYSTEM: UNITED STATES V. DAOUD
In United States v. Daoud, Judge Rovner, writing in her concurring
opinion, stated:
543 U.S. 220, 258 (2005).
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771–72 (2008) (discussing that the constitutional
privilege of habeas corpus extends to noncitizens held in Guantanamo, and the Military
Commissions Act did not provide an adequate habeas substitute and constitutes an unlawful
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567, 650 (2006)
(holding the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 did not strip the United States Supreme Court
of jurisdiction to hear cases being tried before military commissions, and the Bush
Administration’s Military Commissions lacked the power to proceed because the structure
and procedures violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (identifying that persons deemed enemy
combatants have the right to challenge the legality of their detention before a judge or other
neutral decision maker); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004) (providing federal courts
with jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus petitions by or on behalf of persons detained at
the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba); By the Numbers: U.S. Prosecutions of Jihadist
Terror Crimes Since 9/11, CTR. ON NAT’L SEC. AT FORDHAM L. (July 2015),
http://www.centeronnationalsecurity.org/sites/default/files/CNS%20By%20the%20Nu
mbers%20-%20U.S.%20Prosecutions%20of%20Terror%20Crimes%20Since%209-11.pdf
[http://perma.cc/N6SS-H9VV] (stating that 462 terrorism cases have been prosecuted in the
United States since 9/11, the government has a ninety-one percent conviction rate, and
appellate courts have consistently sided with the government in most every FISA related
issue).
58
59
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I believe it is time to recognize that Franks cannot operate
in the FISA context as it does in the ordinary criminal
case. To pretend otherwise does a disservice to the
defendant and to the integrity of the judiciary. We must
recognize both that the defendant cannot make a viable
Franks motion without access to the FISA application, and
that the court, which does have access to the application,
cannot, for the most part, independently evaluate the
accuracy of that application on its own without the
defendant’s knowledge of the underlying facts. Yet,
Franks serves as an indispensable check on potential
abuses of the warrant process, and means must be found
to keep Franks from becoming a dead letter in the FISA
context. The responsibility for identifying a solution lies
with all three branches of government, but as the branch
charged with applying Franks, the duty falls to the
judiciary to acknowledge the problem, make such
accommodations as it can, and call upon the other
branches to make reforms that are beyond our power to
implement.
[...]
My purpose in engaging in this discussion has been to
acknowledge a problem that thus far has not been
addressed as deeply as it should be by the judiciary.
Thirty-six years after the enactment of FISA, it is well past
time to recognize that it is virtually impossible for a FISA
defendant to make the showing that Franks requires in
order to convene an evidentiary hearing, and that a court
cannot conduct more than a limited Franks review on its
own. Possibly there is no realistic means of reconciling
Franks with the FISA process. But all three branches of
government have an obligation to explore that question
thoroughly before we rest with that conclusion. 60
This conundrum Judge Rovner described might be fairly described as
what is known in academic circles as a legal “black hole,” or perhaps
better put, a “legal grey hole[.]”61 This issue and its consequences will

United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479, 486, 496 (7th Cir. 2014).
See Andrew Kent, Disappearing Legal Black Holes and Converging Domains: Changing
Individual Rights Protection in National Security and Foreign Affairs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1029,
1030, 1034 n.23 (2015) (quoting the terms “legal black hole” and “legal grey hole,” and also
attributing the creation of the terms to professor David Dyzenhaus who stated “there are
60
61
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raise its head again once we get to Carl Schmitt, Clinton Rossiter, and
Giorgio Agamben when we take up the discussion of Schmitt’s famous
“state of exception.”62 Black holes, grey holes, the state of exception, and
political theorists such as Schmitt, Rossiter, and Agamben are of little
comfort to Adel Daoud, who currently awaits trial and would like nothing
more than to be able to challenge the 2012 FISA search warrant issued
against him by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”). If
nothing else, however, he accomplished something no defendant in the
thirty-seven year history of FISA has done. He was not only the first
defendant whose counsel was judicially awarded access to FISA search
warrant materials, but he also caused at least one judge from the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals to acknowledge the existence of a very real
problem in national security prosecutions involving FISA.63 While this
admission is probably of little comfort to Daoud, the significance of the
above statements of Judge Rovner, for our present purposes, is
considerable. This is truly a remarkable opinion, and one deserving of far
more attention than it has to date.
In order to appreciate the significance of this opinion, some
background on the case—and its relationship to the political fall-out from
the Edward Snowden foreign intelligence gathering revelations, in
particular, will shed light on our latter discussion concerning Carl
Schmitt’s “state of exception,” politics, and the rule of law.64 On

some legal constraints on executive action—it is not a lawless void—but the constraints are
so insubstantial that they pretty well permit the government to do as it pleases”).
62
See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 1–5 (Kevin Attell trans. 2005) (providing
that while the state of exception has been thoroughly discussed by many scholars, there is
still no theory of it in public law); CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP:
CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES 32 (1948) (explaining that there is no
greater need for the use of extraordinary measures to overcome economic distress than to
avoid war); CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY 5–7 (Thomas McCarthy ed., George
Schwab trans. 1984) (describing this term as any kind of severe political or economic
disturbance that requires the application of extraordinary measures).
63
See Daoud, 755 F.3d at 486 (Rovner, J., concurring) (identifying that Daoud was
presented with the same issue facing all defendants charged on the basis of FISA because to
allege misrepresentations and ill will in a classified affidavit, he would have needed to read
the affidavit).
64
See ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing that the
ACLU would have never learned about FISA’s intelligence gathering operation had it not
been for Edward Snowden’s unauthorized disclosures). The court went on to say, however,
that allowing a lawsuit based on revealing governmental trade secrets, including gathering
telephone metadata, would open the door for any target of FISA to sue in any desired federal
court. Id. at 742. In its closing remarks, the court stated “[t]he right to be free from searches
and seizures is fundamental, but not absolute.” Id. at 756; see also ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d
787, 826 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that the metadata program exceeds the scope of what
Congress authorized and violates section 215 of the PATRIOT Act); OFFICE OF THE UNITED
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September 15, 2012, Daoud, an eighteen-year-old from a northwest
Chicago suburb, was arrested on a criminal complaint in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, charged with
attempting to detonate a weapon of mass destruction in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2331(a)(2)(D), and attempting to destroy a building by an
explosive in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).65 The weapon of mass
destruction was a fake bomb created by the FBI in its undercover
operation, after Daoud had been discovered talking to people overseas via
the Internet.66 Daoud was indicted on September 20, 2012, and shortly
after the return of the indictment, the government filed a Notice of Intent
to Use Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Information (“FISA
Notice”).67 The filing, as is required by the FISA statute, provided formal
notice that the government intended to “offer into evidence, or otherwise
use or disclose in any proceedings in this matter, information obtained
and derived from electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1801–1812 and 1821–1829.”68
After receiving the government’s notice that it intended to use FISA
evidence against Daoud, our firm filed a motion for disclosure of the FISA
materials supporting the warrant request to the FISC. 69 However, in any
other criminal case, the government provides search warrant materials as
a matter of course in routine discovery—without the need for a motion. 70
Then, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(f), 1825(g), Attorney General Eric H.
Holder filed a bare bones affidavit stating, under oath, that disclosure of

STATES ATTORNEYS, supra note 45, at 9-90.010 (providing that the National Security Division
shall be consulted before an adverse ruling is appealed in cases relating to national security).
65
See Daoud, 755 F.3d at 480 (stating that the investigation began in May 2012 for the
September 2012 indictment).
66
The very interesting facts of the case and how the government went about its
undercover investigation—including the use of an undercover agent posing as a terrorist
who pretended to have contact with a radical Muslim cleric from Saudi Arabia, is set forth
in this very detailed thirty-six page Criminal Complaint, Docket No. 1, United States v. Adel
Daoud, (N.D. Ill.) Case No. 12-CR-723 (Coleman, J.).
67
See Defendant’s Motion For Notice of FISA Amendments Act Evidence Pursuant To 50
U.S.C. §§ 1881e(a), 1806(c) at 1–2, United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2014) (No.
1:12-CR-00723) [hereinafter Defendant’s Reply: Disclosure of FISA] (acknowledging that the
government filed its notice of intent to use FISA evidence).
68
Id.
69
See Defendant’s Motion For Disclosure of FISA-Related Material and To Suppress the
Fruits or Derivatives of Electronic Surveillance and Any Other Means of Collection
Conducted Pursuant to FISA or Other Foreign Intelligence Gathering at 1–2, United States v.
Daoud, 755 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 1:12-CR-00723) (illustrating that defense counsel
argued that the information was improperly classified under FISA).
70
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1) (reviewing the Federal Criminal Procedure Rule in regard
to the government’s required disclosure during discovery).
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such materials would harm national security.71 Under the FISA statute,
this filing automatically triggers an in camera, ex parte procedure to
determine whether the surveillance of the aggrieved person was lawfully
authorized and conducted.72 After review by the court, disclosure of the
FISA materials can be disclosed to the defense “only where such
disclosure is necessary to make an accurate determination of the legality
of the surveillance.”73
From the time of FISA’s inception in 1978, disclosure to defense
counsel had never been deemed as necessary; and no defense counsel,
therefore, had ever been granted access to FISA materials.74 In a five-page
order and memorandum opinion issued in response to our request on
January 29, 2014, United States District Court Judge Sharon Johnson
Coleman became the first to do so.75 In her opinion granting disclosure of
the FISA materials, Judge Coleman stated that she was “mindful of the
fact that no court has ever allowed disclosure of FISA materials to the
defense,” she nevertheless found that in Daoud’s case “disclosure may be
necessary.”76 Judge Coleman focused her opinion on the integral role that
the adversarial process—the bedrock of the Sixth Amendment effective
See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(f)–(g), 1825(f)–(g) (2012) (explaining the procedures for in camera
and ex parte review by a district court and the suppression of evidence). Holder’s affidavit
reads in pertinent part as follows: “[T]hat disclosure of an adversary hearing would harm
the national security of the United States and the Court shall then review the FISA materials
in camera and ex parte.” Government’s Unclassified Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion at 1–2, United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 1:12-CR00723); see also Brief of Appellant at 17−18, United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479 (7th Cir.
2014) (No. 1:12-CR-00723) (opposing the motion to suppress FISA information). But this
declaration itself, aside from the definitional issues already mentioned over the blurring of
the lines on what constitutes national security, was not without its own controversy. See
Government’s Unclassified Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion, supra note
71, at 29–30 (arguing how the evidence obtained from the electronic sources is admissible
under the good faith exception). As we pointed out to the Seventh Circuit to no avail, the
government or whomever did not even get this declaration right. Id. at 41. Later in the very
same declaration, Mr. Holder states merely that national security “could harm the national
security interests of the United States.” Brief of the Appellant, supra note 71, at 10.
72
See 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (“If the Attorney General files an affidavit under oath that
disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm the national security of the United States,
review in camera and ex parte the application, order, and such other materials relating to the
surveillance as may be necessary to determine whether the surveillance of the aggrieved
person was lawfully authorized and conducted.”).
73
Id.
74
Spencer Ackerman & Tom McCarthy, Defence Lawyers Granted Access to FISA
Surveillance Documents in Terror Case, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/jan/29/defence-terrorism-case-fisa-documentssurveillance [http://perma.cc/KWA9-N5HA].
75
See United States v. Daoud, No. 12-CR-723, 2014 WL 321384, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2014)
(granting Daoud’s protective order).
76
Id.
71
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assistance of counsel clause—plays in safeguarding the rights of citizens,
noting that the legality of surveillance is best made as part of an
adversarial hearing.77 Nor should it go unnoticed that Judge Coleman
noted that the government had no meaningful response to defense
counsel’s argument that the national security interest at stake would be
jeopardized in light of defense counsel’s Top Secret/Sensitive
Compartmented Information (“TS/SCI”) clearances from the Department
of Justice.78
As such, it is here that one can see the interplay between the “state of
exception,” politics, and the rule of law.79 Even before Judge Coleman’s
ruling, the Daoud case had attracted considerable national media attention
due to a rather fortuitous confluence of events. 80 First, the charges
themselves were sensational to say the least.81 An eighteen year old’s
attempt to blow up a bar in downtown Chicago, as well as the FBI’s
participation in such a “sting” operation, were highly newsworthy and
controversial.82 Second, while Daoud awaited trial, Edward Snowden
leaked classified documents regarding the National Security Agency’s

See id. at *2 (elaborating on the order and the implications of the disclosure). The
argument that a district court’s in camera, ex parte review of FISA materials denies the
defendant his or her Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel gained no
traction when raised in several other FISA related cases. See id. (explaining that the court
had no opinion on the constitutionality of FISA); see also United States v. Warsame, 547 F.
Supp. 2d 982, 989 (D. Minn. 2008) (reasoning how the court’s ability to carefully review FISA
materials adequately safeguards individual’s due process rights); United States v. Benkahla,
437 F. Supp. 2d 541, 554 (E.D. Va. 2006) (holding the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
counsel was not violated by the District Court’s in camera, ex parte review of materials
pursuant to FISA); United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that
the failure of FISA to require disclosure and an adversary hearing does not violate the Sixth
Amendment).
78
See Daoud, 2014 WL 321384, at *2 (“Without a more adequate response to the question
of how disclosure of materials to cleared defense counsel pursuant to protective order
jeopardizes national security, this Court believes that the probable value of disclosure and
the risk of nondisclosure outweigh the potential danger of disclosure to cleared counsel.”).
79
See id. at *3 (demonstrating Judge Coleman’s analysis of the FISA application and
related materials).
80
See Jason Meisner, Lawyers for Terrorism Suspect Take Fight to U.S. Supreme Court, CHI.
TRIB. (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/bolingbrook-plainfield/ctbolingbrook-terrorism-supreme-court-met-20150106-story.html
[http://perma.cc/4ECEBER3] (drawing national attention because of the similarities to Edward Snowden).
81
See Alexandra Clark, 18-Year-Old Charged with Bomb Plot, NBC CHI. (Sept. 17, 2012),
http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/Teen-Charged-with-Trying-to-Blow-Up-BarDowntown-169908976.html [http://perma.cc/8UWD-BPLY] (charging Daoud with trying
to use a weapon of mass destruction and attempt to damage and destroy a building by an
explosive).
82
See id. (explaining that FBI agents had been tracking Daoud).
77
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mass data collection program in June of 2013—a watershed moment that
sparked a national conversation about Internet and telephone privacy.83
Third, in a speech on the Senate floor urging lawmakers to reauthorize
the now highly controversial FISA Amendments Act (“FAA”)84 due to the
Snowden disclosures, Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA) used Daoud’s
arrest as an example of FAA surveillance successfully thwarting an
attack.85 When the prosecution continued to deny that FAA surveillance
produced evidence in Daoud’s case, notwithstanding Senator Feinstein’s
statement, a subpoena was served on the United States Select Committee
on Intelligence, which Senator Feinstein chaired. Counsel for the Office of
Senate Legal Counsel, Morgan J. Frankel, responded to the subpoena by
letter asserting the absolute privilege from compelled document
production or testimony under the Speech or Debate Clause of the United
States Constitution.86 Nonetheless, Mr. Frankel went on to write, without
waiving Senator Feinstein’s or the Intelligence Committee’s legal
See Barton Gellman et al., Edward Snowden Comes Forward as Source of NSA Leaks, WASH.
POST (June 9, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/intelligence-leaders-pushback-on-leakers-media/2013/06/09/fff80160-d122-11e2-a73e-826d299ff459_story.html
[http://perma.cc/AP2D-TTR4] (demonstrating that Edward Snowden stole the PRISM
program); Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine
U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nineus-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d97
0ccb04497_story.html [http://perma.cc/Q79J-UQWM] (exposing the government
programed named PRISM); Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps
into User Data of Apple, Google and Others, THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data
[http://perma.cc/RKR7-SRFY] (explaining that the PRISM program collects various online
user data).
84
See 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a) (2012) (permitting the Attorney General and Director of National
Intelligence (“DNI”) to “authorize jointly, for a period of up to [one] year . . . the targeting of
persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign
intelligence information.”). Though the FAA prohibits the government from “intentionally
targeting[ing] any person known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United
States,” the FAA can nonetheless sweep up the international communications of U.S. citizens
and residents—and the Attorney General and DNI may authorize “mass acquisition” under
§ 1881(a) that encompasses thousands or millions of communications even where it is known
in advance that the communications will originate or terminate inside the United States. Id.;
see also Defendant’s Reply: Disclosure of FISA, supra note 67, at 6–7 (explaining the
government’s opinion on § 1881).
85
See 158 CONG. REC. 168 (2012) (showing that Senator Feinstein stated that a “plot to
bomb a downtown Chicago bar” was among those attacks thwarted using FAA
surveillance—which unmistakably references Daoud’s case); see also Defendant’s Motion for
Disclosure of FISA-Related Material and To Suppress the Fruits and Derivatives of Electronic
Surveillance and Any Other Means of Collection Conducted Pursuant to FISA or Other
Foreign Intelligence Gathering, supra note 69, at 1–2.
86
See Defendant’s Reply: Disclosure of FISA, supra note 67, at 2 (declining to comply with
Daoud’s request for production).
83
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privilege, that although Senator Feinstein spoke in support of
reauthorizing Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
“Senator Feinstein did not state, and did not mean to state, that FAA
surveillance was used in any or all of the nine cases she enumerated,
including Mr. Daoud’s case, in which terrorist plots had been stopped.” 87
Instead, Mr. Frankel said that “nothing in Senator Feinstein’s remarks
[were] intended to convey any view that FAA authorities were used or
were not used in Mr. Daoud’s case or in any of the other cases specifically
named.”88 “Rather, her purpose in reviewing several recent terrorism
arrests was to refute the ‘view by some that the country no longer needs
to fear attack.’”89
Snowden’s public revelations permitted us to plead considerable
allegations of FISA abuse that would not otherwise have been available.90
To prove the value of transparency, his revelations were a treasure trove
of disclosures of government abuse in the FISA process. 91 One internal
NSA audit obtained by Snowden revealed that the NSA broke privacy
rules or overstepped its legal authority thousands of times each year, and
that the FISC, which has some authority over NSA operations, did not
learn about certain NSA collection methods until they had been operating
for many months.92 In addition, pursuant to a directive from President
Obama, and in an effort to control the damage in the wake of the public
fallout from the Snowden leaks, the Director of National Intelligence
(“DNI”), James R. Clapper, declassified and disclosed several FISC
opinions, orders, pleadings, internal documents, and documents
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
89
See id. (quoting Senator Feinstein’s December 27, 2012, speech). The author leaves the
meaning, or lack thereof, of this statement to speak for itself. The same can be said to the
reference interjecting fear of future attacks.
90
See id. at 3–4 (“The recent and ongoing disclosures of FISA related-materials weigh
heavily against conducting proceedings shrouded by the veil of secrecy that the prosecutors
request here. These disclosures are material to the Court’s analysis for two principal reasons.
First, they demonstrate that discussion of these once-secret issues in the public sphere is
appropriate and, indeed, necessary. Second, and perhaps a corollary to the first point, the
disclosures of evidence how government attorneys have so repeatedly mislead judges—
either directly or through omission—in ex parte settings and why the disclosure of FISA
materials and an adversarial hearing is necessary to guard against such misrepresentations.
To appreciate this rather startling point, the Court need look no further than recently
disclosed FISC opinions.”).
91
See id. at 12 (showing that criminal defendants were first notified of the use of FAA
surveillance in 2013).
92
See Barton Gellman, NSA Broke Privacy Rules Thousands of Times Per Year, Audit Finds,
WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wrld/nationalsecurity/nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/2013/08/15/33
10e554-05ca-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story.html. [http://perma.cc/S8C3-HQH4] (showing
how the NSA broke the law).
87
88
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submitted to the FISC.93 The FISC judges themselves, providing a scathing
indictment of the NSA’s electronic surveillance programs, detailed
pervasive statutory violations, government misrepresentations, and noncompliance with FISC orders.94
In his opinion in In re Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted],
Judge Reggie B. Walton of the District Court for the District of Columbia,
himself no novice or shrinking violet when it comes to national security
matters, documented numerous abuses, writing:


“The government compounded its non-compliance with the
Court’s orders by repeatedly submitting inaccurate
descriptions of the alert list process to the FISC.” 95



“In summary, since January 15, 2009, it has finally come
to light that the FISC’s authorizations of the vast
collection program have been premised on a flawed
depiction of how the NSA uses BR [Business Records]
metadata. This misperception by the FISC existed from
the inception of its authorized collection in May 2006,
buttressed by repeated inaccurate statements made in the
government’s submissions, and despite a governmentdevised and Court-mandated oversight regime. The
minimization procedures proposed by the government in
each successive application and approved and adopted as
binding by the orders of the FISC have been so frequently
and systematically violated that it can fairly be said that
this critical element of the overall BR regime has never
functioned effectively.”96

In a FISC opinion authored by Judge John D. Bates of the District
Court for the District of Columbia, Judge Bates called the NSA’s
See James R. Clapper, DNI Clapper Declassifies Additional Intelligence Community
Documents Regarding Collection Under Section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
OFF. OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.dni.gov/
index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/964-dni-clapper-declassifies
-additional-intelligence-community-documents-regarding-collection-under-section-501-ofthe-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-act-nov [http://perma.cc/S8C3-HQH4] (illustrating
the declassification of documents related to sensitive programs directed by President
Obama).
94
See, e.g., In re Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted] No. BR 08-13, 2009 WL
9150913, at *1 (Mar. 2, 2009) (determining what is reasonable under the NSA surveillance of
counterterrorism).
95
Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
96
Id. at *5.
93
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surveillance under the FAA “deficient on statutory and constitutional
grounds.”97 In two of his highly critical opinions made public, the very
national-security seasoned Judge Bates wrote critically:


“[F]or the first time, the government has now advised the Court
that the volume and nature of the information it has been
collecting is fundamentally different than what the Court had
been led to believe.”98



“The sheer volume of transaction acquired by NSA
through its upstream collection is such that any
meaningful review of the entire body of transactions is
not feasible.”99



“[T]he government acknowledges that the NSA exceeded the
scope of authorized acquisition continuously during the more
than [Redacted] years of acquisition under these orders.”100

These FISA opinions and the general Snowden revelations were not only
quite helpful to our argument in Daoud, but it should also be noted that
they have been used to fashion several significant congressional
modifications to FISA and FISC procedures, which were included in the
recently passed USA Freedom Act. 101 Because of the controversy
generated by the Snowden disclosures, and Senator Feinstein’s comments,
the oral argument before Judge Coleman was widely covered by local and
national press.102 For the same reasons, Judge Coleman’s opinion issued
a few months later on January 19, 2014, attracted significant media
attention as well.103
Id. at *1.
Id. at *9 (emphasis added).
99
Id. at *10.
100
In re Production of Tangible Things, 2009 WL 9150913, at *2–3 (emphasis added).
101
See Jeremy Diamond, NSA Surveillance Bill Passes After Weeks-long Showdown, CNN
POLITICS (Sept. 7, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/02/politics/senate-usa-freedomact-vote-patriot-act-nsa/ [http://perma.cc/3GBJ-FRVS] (discussing that the bill’s passage
resulted from the leak of NSA information by Edward Snowden).
102
See Jason Meisner, Judge Rejects Looking into if Surveillance Program Led to Terrorism
Charge, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 20, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-01-20/news/chiadel-daoud-hillside-bomb-plot-terrorism-20140120_1_such-surveillance-surveillanceprogram-electronic-surveillance [http://perma.cc/H9ZT-FJN2] (expressing that media
outlets and other political figures had commented on the Daoud case because of the Snowden
exposures).
103
See Jason Meisner, Defense in Loop Bomb Plot Case to Get Secret Terror Court Filings, CHI.
TRIB. (Jan. 29, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-01-29/news/chi-adel-daoudfisa-court-ruling-20140129_1_adel-daoud-terrorism-prosecutions-thomas-anthony-durkin
97
98
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The government immediately filed an interlocutory appeal to the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and after considerable briefing by the
parties, oral arguments were held on June 4, 2014, including the filing of
an amicus brief by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic
Frontier Foundation urging affirmance of Judge Coleman’s order. 104 After
the oral argument concluded, Judge Richard Posner, speaking for the
panel, ordered the courtroom cleared for a second, ex parte oral argument,
which he described as a “secret hearing.” 105 Ex parte hearings, usually
held in District Courts on matters involving FISA and CIPA, are scheduled
in advance and rarely attract the attention of the press. 106 The Seventh
Circuit, however, gave no public notice that it intended to conduct this
secret hearing, which caught the press off guard and caused a bit of an
uproar in the courtroom, with at least one reporter voicing an objection.107
After the courtroom was cleared for the classified or secret oral argument,
the U.S. Marshal’s Office came to the courtroom door and checked the
identification of the government lawyers, agents, and other personnel
who would be permitted access to the closed hearing. 108 More than two-

[http://perma.cc/37A8-DQ75] (stating that Judge Coleman’s order will require federal
prosecutors to make available search warrant applications, which are usually not viewed by
defense counsel in terrorism prosecutions); see also Ackerman & McCarthy, supra note 74
(noting that Judge Coleman ruled Adel Daoud’s defense should be made aware of the
beginning of the surveillance by the FBI and other intelligence agencies); Charlie Savage,
Warrantless Surveillance Challenged by Defendant, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2014),
http://www.nytimes/com/2014/01/30/us/warrantless-surveillance-challenged-bydefendant.html [http://perma.cc/3XX8-XV5M] (addressing a Colorado resident charged
with terrorism offenses challenging the constitutionality of surveillance without warrants in
the United States and Judge Coleman’s ruling in Illinois); Adel Daoud Terrorism Case:
Arguments on Surveillance Set in Teen’s Terrorism Case, HUFF. POST (Jan. 3, 2014),
http://huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/03/adel-daoud-terrorism-case_n_4536652.html
[http://perma.cc/7QG3-TT52] (discussing the Adel Daoud hearing and the arguments on
expanded surveillance before Judge Coleman’s ruling).
104
See Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties
Union of Illinois, and Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of Defendant-Appellee and
Urging Affirmance at 25, United States v. Daoud, 761 F.3d 678 (7th. Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1284)
(highlighting that the court granting the disclosure order protects the liberties and security
of the nation).
105
See Jason Meisner, Appeals Court in Chicago Holds Highly Unusual “Secret” Session, CHI.
TRIB. (June 4, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-06-04/news/chi-appealscourts-in-chicago-holds-highly-unusual-secret-session-20140604
[http://perma.cc/ZTJ7E7CE] (noting that Judge Posner ordered the courtroom to be cleared after the arguments
had been heard for a private session).
106
See id. (expressing that in ex parte hearings, counsel are usually given notice of the
hearing and the move by Judge Posner was unexpected).
107
See id. (illustrating that the ex parte hearing not only caught the attorneys for the parties
off guard, reporters also noted the unexpected nature of the hearing order by Judge Posner).
108
Id.
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dozen prosecutors and agents were counted as having advanced
permission to re-enter the closed courtroom.109
After the arguments, we learned that the FBI conducted a sweep of
the courtroom to check for bugs or recording devices the morning of the
arguments, and the Seventh Circuit’s courtroom staff “misinterpreted”
this sweep and failed to turn on the recording devices that regularly
record oral arguments for publication on the Court’s website.110 Thus, no
recording or transcript was made of the public oral argument, although a
stenographic transcript was made of the secret or classified ex parte
hearing.111 Court Clerk Gino Agnello was later quoted in the press as
saying that “his staff sort of freaked out” before the hearing.112 Agnello
said the “[c]ourt staff who operated the audio recorder saw FBI agents
sweeping the courtroom for bugs and ‘misinterpreted’ that to mean they
shouldn’t record the hearing.”113
Because of this embarrassing,
unprecedented flub, the Seventh Circuit ordered a second day of oral
argument, which occurred a few days later on June 9, 2014.114
In explaining the grant of a second oral argument, Judge Posner
pointed out that recording oral arguments was not required by law, but
due to the “high-profile case involving very serious criminal charges
against the appellee” the Court was taking the “unusual step of ordering
a second oral argument.”115 The description of the rather comedic aspect
See Michael Tarm, Arguments in Chicago Focus on Secret FISA Records, YAHOO NEWS (June
4, 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/arguments-chicago-focus-secret-fisa-records-010333044.
html [http://perma.cc/R6LP-8RAB] (remarking that a number of people had advance
clearance to remain in the courtroom for the secret hearing order by Judge Posner).
110
See Kim Janssen, Court Staff Goofs, Fails to Record Hearing in Terror Trial, CHI. SUN-TIMES
(June 5, 2014), http://chicago.suntimes.com/politics/7/71/164804/court-staff-goofs-failsto-record-hearing-in-terror-trial [http://perma.cc/A2NF-GD33] (explaining that the court
reporters misinterpreted the sweep of the courtroom for recording devices, which lead to the
failure of recording devices in courtroom to be turned on for the secret hearing).
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
See Meisner, supra note 105.
115
See Oral Argument at 1:51, United States v. Daoud, 761 F.3d 678 (7th. Cir. 2014) (No. 141284), http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/oralArguments/oar.jsp?caseyear=14&casenumber=
1284&listCase=List+case%28s%29 [http://perma.cc/T73B-TZYS] (stating that the recording
of the secret hearing was a misunderstanding and was not required by law). It is worth restating Judge Posner’s exact statement on the record:
Now, I want to dispel what appears to be a misunderstanding, now,
recording, whether it’s . . . electronic or stenographic, or what have you,
of oral arguments in federal court of appeals is not required by law, or
anything; and the recordings are not required to be made public. Until
our recording equipment was installed, no record was made by the
court of the oral arguments. And initially, the recordings were available
just to the judges and their staff to kind of refresh their recollection of
109
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of all this is not meant as an attempt to embarrass the Court, but instead
makes the point that the introduction of national security issues—down
to the very sweeping of the courtroom for bugs by the FBI or whatever
other intelligence agency might have been involved in the sweeping—
introduces a level of tension that in addition to spooking the court
personnel of the Seventh Circuit, cannot help but create an aura of fear
that unnecessarily escalates the magnitude of the case and the seriousness
of the very charges themselves.116
Within one week from the second oral argument, the Seventh Circuit,
in a panel opinion authored by Judge Posner, reversed the District Court’s
grant of disclosure of FISA court materials. Notably, the Seventh Circuit
issued both public and classified written opinions. 117 However, the
significance of the court’s opinion, for purposes of this discussion, lies not
so much in the reversal; rather, it is in the reasoning of Judge Rovner’s
concurrence.118
Judge Rovner discussed the impossibility of reconciling a criminal
defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to a Franks challenge in the context
the oral argument, but eventually we decided to make the recordings
available to the public as well . . . what this means is since we’re not
required to make a public or indeed any record of oral arguments, we
have no legal obligation to conduct a second oral argument in this case.
But because the inadvertent failure to record uh occurred in the . . . its a
high-profile case involving very serious criminal charges against the
defendant, so we decided to take the unusual step of ordering a second
oral argument even though the case itself is not being reheard, whether
by the panel or by the full court, following the issuance of a decision . . . .
Id.
It is no secret that on days when national security cases are heard, courthouse security
is often greatly enhanced. On hearing days when spectators are anticipated, it is not unusual
for the U.S. Marshals’ Service to have a bomb-sniffing dog walking the lobby or courtroom
floor. On many occasions, even an extra metal detector is installed outside the courtroom
door and the bomb sniffing dog sits next to the detector. Whether this is at the direction of
the intelligence agencies or is intentionally orchestrated theater, is anyone’s guess. As will
be mentioned later, however, the author ascribes no ill will to any of the participants
involved, including judges, court staff, security, court personnel, the U.S. Marshal Service,
or the like. As should be expected, working day in, day out, in the courts, relationships are
regularly formed, and the relationships at the Dirksen Federal Building in Chicago in the
author’s experience are, for the most part, exceptionally good and professional.
117
See United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479, 483 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating that it was the
judge’s “obligation” to determine whether defense counsel was entitled to FISA material);
see also United States v. Daoud, 761 F.3d 678, 683 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that the information
collected from surveillance should not be suppressed); infra App’x A (displaying the
redacted, classified written opinion is attached hereto as Appendix A). The thirteen-page
opinion is worth a visual inspection by anyone who dares to think that the idea of a twotiered system is fictional. Infra App’x A. Of the thirteen pages, at least half of the opinion is
redacted, rendering it meaningless to both the defense counsel and the public. Id.
118
See generally Daoud, 755 F.3d at 485 (Rovner, J., concurring) (showing the concurring
opinion of Judge Rovner).
116
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of a FISA search warrant, admitting that, without access to the FISA
affidavit, a defendant could not identify misrepresentations in it—let
alone establish if they were intentionally or recklessly made.119 Judge
Rovner bluntly stated that: “As a practical matter, the secrecy shrouding
the FISA process renders it impossible for a defendant to meaningfully
obtain relief under Franks absent a patent inconsistency in the FISA
application itself or a sua sponte disclosure by the government that the
FISA application contained a material misstatement or omission.” 120
Despite acknowledging that FISA arguably reads Franks out of existence,
in the context of a FISA search warrant, Judge Rovner nonetheless decided
that this problem calls for the “other branches to make reforms that are
beyond our power to implement.” 121
Put simply, despite her
characterization of Franks as “a vital part of the criminal process that
subjects warrant affidavits to useful adversarial testing” and “a
meaningful deterrent to an overzealous law enforcement official[,]” this
vital Fourth Amendment procedural due process issue—available to any
defendant in any other type of federal criminal case—falls down the rabbit
hole in the face of an out of court, untested declaration of the Attorney
General that disclosing FISA materials or holding an adversarial hearing
would harm the national security of the United States. 122
In addition to a constitutional procedural due process right slipping
down this rabbit hole, it should be rather obvious that what is now only a
hole could well turn into something the size of the Grand Canyon if, as
mentioned earlier, “national security” can be so easily mixed up with
foreign policy, domestic policy, concepts of traditional warfare, and
existential threats to the homeland.123 More importantly, if Glennon’s
double government theory is correct that the president himself or his
attorney general are not truly making the decision as to what may harm
national security, can that very decision be trusted?124 While it has not yet

See id. at 486 (Rovner, J., concurring) (describing how a Franks motion is based on
material representations and omissions in a warrant affidavit).
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 489 (Rovner, J., concurring).
123
See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text (exploring how national security can be
mixed in various domestic aspects).
124
What can readily be seen is the effort of the intelligence agencies to resist any effort to
control their province. This agency concern is not limited to defense lawyers. A telling
description of the issue is set forth in former CIA lawyer John Rizzo’s recent book. In
discussing the use of classified evidence in espionage cases, and the tension created between
the agency and the DOJ prosecutors, Rizzo candidly acknowledges: “We tell the DOJ that
we will turn cartwheels to provide our intelligence secrets necessary to get a conviction, but
we are going to push back hard if we think that DOJ is going for ‘overkill’ by putting sensitive
119
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come to this on any grand scale, as might be expected with expanded
foreign intelligence surveillance, the issue surrounding disclosure of FISA
materials is beginning to appear in federal criminal prosecutions such as
trade secrets and child pornography cases. 125 To be clear, there is no
prohibition against the use of FISA materials in traditional criminal
prosecutions provided that the advance authorization is obtained from the
attorney general, proper notice is subsequently given to the court and to
the aggrieved persons against whom the information is to be used, and
that proper minimization procedures have been utilized. 126
Nevertheless, who is to say that, much like the blurring of the
definitional lines at the end of the two World Wars that in the modern,
inter-connected, globalized neoliberal world we increasingly find
ourselves in, all things economic will not become matters of “national
security.”127 There is plenty of historical precedent for the exercise of
information into jeopardy when it doesn’t have to.” JOHN RIZZO, COMPANY MAN: THIRTY
YEARS OF CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS IN THE CIA 67 (2014).
125
See Notice of Intent to Use Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Information, United
States v. Hailong, 4:13-CR-147 (S.D. Iowa) (providing notice to the defendant of 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1806(c) and section 1825(d)); Post Indictment Arraignment Calendar, United States v.
Gartenlaub, 8:14-CR-173 (C.D. Cal.) (illustrating the use of FISA in child pornography cases);
see also GROSS & NÍ AOLÁIN, supra note 55, at 232 (“The government is using its expanded
authority under the far-reaching law to investigate suspected drug traffickers, white-collar
criminals, blackmailers, child pornographers, money launderers, spies, and even corrupt
foreign officials.”).
126
See 50 U.S.C. § 1806(b)–(c) (2012) (focusing upon the sections entitled Statement for
Disclosure and Notification by United States in the § 1806 Use of Information statute); 50
U.S.C. § 1825(c)–(e) (2012) (narrowing upon the sections entitled Statement for Disclosure,
Notification by United States, and Notification by States or Political Subdivisions within the
general section 1825 Use of Information statute). Further, FISA expressly states that the
government is not required to minimize information that is “evidence of a crime” whether
or not it is also foreign intelligence information. See id. § 1801(h) (illustrating the definition
of minimization procedures with regard to electronic surveillance); 50 U.S.C. § 1821(4) (2012)
(providing the definition of minimization procedures for physical searches); see also United
States v. Isa, 923 F.2d 1300, 1307 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the appellant’s Sixth
Amendment rights had not been violated).
127
See WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH REVOLUTION 22
(2015) (relaying the dire consequences to democracy of a neoliberal rationale in a globalized
world). While the scope of Professor Brown’s work is beyond the confines of an article such
as this one, a pair of chapters, in particular, entitled “Neoliberalism’s Remaking of State and
Subject” and “Law and Legal Reason,” may instruct. As Professor Brown states:
As both individual and state become projects of management, rather
than rule, as an economic framing and economic ends replace political
ones, a range of concerns become subsumed to the project of capital
enhancement, recede altogether, or are radically transformed as they are
“economized.” These include justice (and its subelements, such as liberty,
equality, fairness), individual and popular sovereignty, and the rule of law.
They also include the knowledge and the cultural orientation relevant
to even the most modes practices of democratic citizenship.
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emergency powers in the economic realm as was evidenced by the New
Deal’s response to the Great Depression, and President Roosevelt’s
attempts to take control over American industry for the World War II war
effort.128 Is it too much to dare to suggest that the day might soon come
when traditional economic fraud prosecutions—for example, matters
involving commodities fraud at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, or bidrigging on a military transport plane being built by the Boeing
Corporation headquartered in Chicago—could easily become “national
security” prosecutions?
Thus, the question that begs answering is: do we wish to waive a
judicial white flag in surrendering any meaningful role of the judiciary in
matters merely alleged to involve national security, if that definition can
be dictated by the Attorney General, his Assistant Attorney General of the
National Security Division, the Director of National Intelligence, or
whomever actually makes the decision? 129 Most certainly, there is plenty
of history and precedent to answer in the affirmative. However, then we
must ask whether we have the courage to admit it. This answer might
not sit well with those fellow citizens, politicians, judges and lawyers with
strong Madisonian attachments to links to our imagined past grandeur,
filled as it is with more pomp and historical symbolism than substance. 130
Id. (emphasis added).
128
See Roger I. Roots, Government by Permanent Emergency: The Forgotten History of the New
Deal Constitution, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 259, 259–60 (2000) (detailing some of the New Deal’s
impact on America).
129
See GROSS & NÍ AOLÁIN, supra note 55, at 232 (discussing the effects on the judiciary
when the definition of national security can be changed). This definitional problem is at the
heart of our following discussion of Schmitt, sovereignty, the “state of exception,” and not
coincidentally “dictatorship.” For but one observation along the same lines:
The difficulties of distinguishing between economic and violent
emergencies are part of a bigger problem of definitions. Exigencies
provoke the use of emergency powers by governmental authorities. The
vast scope of such powers and their ability to interfere with
fundamental individual rights and civil liberties and to all
governmental regulation of virtually all aspects of human activity—as
well as the possibility of their abuse—emphasize the pressing need for
clearly defining the situations in which they may be invoked. Yet,
defining what constitutes a “state of emergency” is no easy task . . . .
Id. at 5.
130
To be fair, my pessimism may well be overstated, as can often admittedly be the case
from the vantage point of the courtroom floor. There are certainly many legal scholars in
addition to Judge Posner who would disagree that the sky is anywhere near falling or, I am
sure, that we are developing a two-tiered system of criminal justice in the federal courts. As
noted earlier, Professor Kent’s recent article on the disappearance of black holes certainly
views the glass as becoming more full than empty insofar as individual rights are concerned.
See Kent, supra note 61, at 1030, 1034 n.23 (reviewing Kent’s analysis of the black hole
phenomenon). As also can be gleaned from Professor Kent’s article, he has considerable
academic scholarly support that things may in fact be getting better, including Jack

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 2 [2016], Art. 3

450

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

IV. ARE WE IN A PERMANENT STATE OF EXCEPTION OR CAN WE AT LEAST
HAVE THE ADULT CONVERSATIONS PROFESSORS LEVINSON AND GLENNON
URGE OUTSIDE THE ACADEMY
Procedural constitutional questions, in the relatively small amount of
terrorist trials in the federal courts, pale by comparison to the risks the
executive branch and its intelligence agencies face in their obligation to
keep the nation safe.131 It is certainly not suggested that those less
concerned with civil liberties are no less genuinely dedicated or sincere in
their motives. Like Professor Glennon, I readily admit that most
individuals involved in the everyday prosecution of federal criminal
cases, national security or otherwise, try to maintain every bit as much
faithfulness to the system. However, the structural issues Glennon raises
in his theory of double government go far beyond the good faith or
sincerity of the lawyers or judges involved in the everyday workings of
the system. Just as I appreciated the help when the Seventh Circuit panel
suggested at the second oral argument in Daoud that its secret session was
for the benefit of the defense lawyers, it is nothing personal to ask instead
to be able to do it myself for the sake of the adversarial system. 132 In
addition to chiding the growing lack of oversight of the Trumanites by the
three Madisonian institutions, Professor Glennon does not spare any
criticism on the citizenry itself, if one might still call the modern United
States electorate “citizens.”133
Glennon does not believe there is any risk of sudden despotism in this
country, any more than I fear the sudden implementation of a Star
Goldsmith, Robert Chesney, Joseph Landau, Richard Pildes and Samuel Issacharoff’s similar
optimism in the context of other national security issues. Id. at 1034–35. In fact, Professor
Kent refers to the fact that Professor Dyzenhaus himself, “who focuses primarily on the
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, sees evidence that courts are gradually closing
legal black holes in those countries by ‘put[ting] a rule-of-law spine into the adjudication of
national security.’” Id. at 1034. Whether this is truly “rule of law” spine, as compared to one
of “rule by law,” remains to be seen.
131
This is no doubt a gargantuan task and a solemn responsibility. An issue that often
arises in discussions with those in positions of such responsibility, however, is what might
be best described as the “if you only knew what I know” phenomenon. Having represented
Ramzi bin al-Shibh in the 9/11 case, and the number of other domestic terrorism cases
mentioned, I have come to get quite a bit of an insider’s perspective about the threat of
terrorism post 9/11. Suffice it to say, admittedly without the benefit of the President’s daily
intelligence briefings and other wider inside intelligence, I am still waiting to hear something
that would change my opinion that we have overreacted.
132
See generally Oral Argument, United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479, 485 (7th Cir. 2014),
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2014/rs.14-1284.14-1284_06_09_2014.mp3
(providing a link to the audio file of Judge Posner).
133
See BROWN, supra note 127, at 79–115 (giving a description of the ideological or
rationality shift from homo politicus to homo economicus; in particular, the chapter entitled
“Revising Foucault: Homo Politicus and Homo Oeconomicus”).
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Chamber or the Spanish Inquisition in the Dirksen Federal Building in
Chicago.134 In fact, Glennon calls the risk of sudden despotism “trivial,” a
bit more credit than I might cynically be willing to give to the state of our
courts, but a reasonably fair description there nonetheless.135 As Glennon
says, it is the very lack of fear of “an abrupt turn to a police state or
dictatorship installed with a coup-like surprise,” that created “a false
sense of security in the United States.”136 It is not the risk of a “strongman
of the sort easily visible in history[,]” that Glennon thinks is apt to burst
forth on the American scene, although it must be noted that Glennon’s
article was written before Donald Trump emerged as an early leader in
the 2016 Republican Primary polls.137 Ignorance, or more kindly, apathy
of the electorate might instead be a greater danger. This risk, Glennon
warns, is a risk similar to the gradual structural incentives for the
bureaucratic centralization of power in the hands of the Trumanite
national security state.138 A greater risk than the strongman, Glennon
submits, is the “risk of slowly tightening centralized power, growing and
evolving organically beyond public view, increasingly unresponsive to
the Madisonian checks and balances.”139 Glennon also cites the rather
disturbing fact that in the twentieth century “some seventy democracies
collapsed and quietly gave way to authoritarian regimes.” 140 Glennon
argues that this risk of collapse directly “correlates with voter
ignorance[,]” for, as he puts it further, “the term Orwellian has little
meaning to a people who have never know anything different, who have
scant knowledge of history, civics, or public affairs, and who in any event
have likely never heard of George Orwell.” 141 Further, Glennon concludes
his article with a poignant quote from Thomas Jefferson: “If a nation
See Glennon, supra note 4, at 13 (referencing the notion of a “sudden despotism”).
See id. at 112 (stating that there is only a “trivial risk of sudden despotism”).
136
Id. at 112–13.
137
Id. at 113; see, e.g., Dan Balz & Scott Clement, Poll: Trump, Carson Top GOP Race; Clinton
Leads
Dems
but
Support
Drops,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
14,
2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/poll-trump-carson-top-gop-race-clinton-leadsdems-but-support-drops/2015/09/13/7961a820-58c2-11e5-8bb1-b488d231bba2_story.html
[http://perma.cc/8HJF-E3K6] (announcing the results of a recent poll showing Donald
Trump leading the Republican presidential field).
138
See Glennon, supra note 4, at 109 (concluding that the network within the federal
government controlling national security matters evolved in response to “structural
incentives rather than invidious intent”).
139
Id. at 113.
140
Id. Glennon attributes this statistic to Robert A. Dahl and notes that Dahl pointed out
that the collapse of the seventy democracies took place during “the century of democracy’s
greatest triumph.” Id. Glennon also quotes Dahl as saying poignantly “the most disastrous
decisions in the twentieth century . . . turned out to be those made by authoritarian leaders
free from democratic restraints.” Id. at 112.
141
Id. at 113.
134
135
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expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, . . . it expects what
never was and never will be.”142 Glennon poses a final question with
respect to what form of government might ultimately emerge from
America’s experiment with double government. 143 He then answers his
own question by saying that the form of government that is likely to
emerge is uncertain.144 Then, Glennon warns ominously, “[t]he risk is
considerable, however, that it will not be a democracy.” 145
The same question, as to the form our government might take, is what
causes me to ask whether we, as lawyers, also wish to accept the
possibility of a permanent two-tiered system of justice in our federal
courts.146 It is this same sense of uneasiness and the same sense of a
gradual increase of governmental centralized control over the criminal
process in my forty plus year career fighting courtroom “wars,” be it
against crime, drugs, or terror that leaves me with much the same
ominous sense of dread. Again, it is not the fear of the Grand Inquisitor
taking over as Chief Judge tomorrow that makes me nervous.
Nevertheless, there is something horribly foreboding about being asked
to leave an American courtroom in the name of “national security”—
despite my having even higher security clearances than most
prosecutors—so that those prosecutors can tell the court in an ex parte
non-public secret proceeding what transpired with respect to how they
obtained evidence to be used against one’s client. Conversely, there is
something sickening to one’s sense of justice or fundamental fairness—
whatever that may have meant once before—to be provided with redacted
discovery, transcripts, appellate opinions, or transcripts of proceedings.147
It is for this reason that the Seventh Circuit’s classified opinion has been

Glennon, supra note 4, at 113. Using the analogy of “Joe Six-Pack’s” ability to
comprehend American football’s use of a nickel defense or whether to run a play-action fake
on third down and two, Glennon explains that this voter apathy is neither unintelligent nor
irrational, insofar as a single voter’s ability to determine an outcome of an election in any
event, particularly in light of a lack of change in national security policy from one president
to the next. Id. at 108. Calling the decision to run the play-option not much “conceptually”
different than making the decision to strike a high value target driving with four unidentified
co-conspirators in Yemen, Glennon posits that there is little obvious reason for one to become
informed: “Why waste time learning about things one cannot affect?” Id.
143
Id. at 113.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Glennon, supra note 4, at 113 (“What form of government ultimately will emerge from
the United States’ experiment with double government is uncertain.”). Glennon also notes
that the FISC “pioneered a two-tiered legal system.” Id. at 54.
147
See, e.g., United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 2014) (responding to a
discovery request, the prosecutor filed two responses, a heavily redacted version to the
defense counsel and a classified version accessible only to the court).
142
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attached in the Appendix for all to view. 148 Perhaps if enough people,
particularly lawyers, they, too, will be as concerned, but maybe not, and I
would not bet on it.
Returning to Daoud, most of our attention has focused on Judge
Rovner’s concurring opinion to this point. However, there are some issues
in Judge Posner’s majority opinion that might give one pause to be
concerned over the state of the adversarial process, if nothing else. Judge
Posner goes out of his way to comment upon a defense objection to the
closed proceeding after the first oral argument. He let it be known that
our objection to the secret hearing was without merit as a matter of law,
but also as a matter of fact.149 Judge Posner explained that the “purpose
of the hearing was to explore, by questioning the government’s lawyer on
the basis of the classified materials, the need for defense access to those
materials (which the judges and their cleared staff had read).”150 The
Judge went on to point out that: “[i]n effect this was cross-examination of
the government, and could only help the defendant.” 151 With all due
respect to Judge Posner, while he may be far smarter, I would venture to
guess I am a far better cross-examiner. However, the point is hardly who
is a smarter or a better cross-examiner. The point is that an encroaching
two-tiered adversarial system, that the Seventh Circuit seems quite
willing to countenance, does not bode well for the adversarial system to
which we have grown accustomed.152 Judge Posner’s comment, that
bodes perhaps even more poorly for the adversarial system, was in respect
to the possession of security clearances by defense counsel. 153 As
mentioned, this factor had been a significant factor in Judge Coleman’s
decision to permit production of the FISA materials. 154 Judge Posner’s
reprimanded Judge Coleman for thinking that “disclosing state secrets to

See infra App’x A (displaying the publically accessible, redacted, classified written
opinion)
149
See Daoud, 755 F.3d at485 (Rovner, J., concurring) (noting that the legality of an ex parte
hearing has been affirmed by two other circuits and could only have aided the defense, as it
was a cross-examination of the prosecution).
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
See Glennon, supra note 4, at 54 (noting the two-tiered legal system consists of one tier
“comprised of public law, the other of secret law”).
153
See Daoud, 755 F.3d at 484–85 (holding that disclosing classified information to defense
counsel, despite counsel’s security clearance, could harm national security).
154
See supra Part III (explaining that Judge Coleman relied on the fact that the prosecution
had no meaningful rebuttal to the argument that disclosure in Daoud was reasonable because
of defense counsel’s security clearance); see also United States v. Daoud, No. 12-CR-723, 2014
WL 321384, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2014) (discussing that the probable value of disclosure and
the associated risks of nondisclosure outweighed the potential dangers of disclosure in
regard to cleared counsel).
148

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 2 [2016], Art. 3

454

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

cleared lawyers could not harm national security.” 155 “Not true,” he
stated.156 Judge Posner’s explanation as to why this is the case lets defense
lawyers know where they stand in his hierarchy:
Though it is certainly highly unlikely that Daoud’s
lawyers would, Snowden-like, publicize classified
information in violation of federal law, they might in their
zeal to defend their client, to whom they owe a duty of
candid communication, or misremembering what is
classified and what is not, inadvertently say things that
would provide clues to classified material. 157
His statement needs to be considered in the context of the number of
people deemed trustworthy enough to be allowed in the closed hearing
after clearing the courtroom.158 As previously mentioned, “about a
dozen” prosecutors and government agents were permitted back into the
courtroom.159 Then, add to that the number of court personnel given
clearances to assist the judges in reading the materials, which leaves one
to guess that at least thirty-five or forty people must have been deemed
trustworthy enough to attend the secret hearing. 160
Nevertheless, this fact maybe not be the most frightening prospect of
all. As Glennon suggests of the citizenry, maybe lawyers themselves have
also reached the point that no one cares—or that the truth is that lawyers,
like the rest of the citizenry, are more concerned about their safety than
their liberty, as is so often suggested. 161 For this reason, Professor
Levinson’s question about whether one can have “an adult conversation”
about Carl Schmitt’s “state of exception” must be answered, since this
question seems to also be at the root of Professor Glennon’s question as to
Daoud, 755 F.3d at 484.
Id.
157
Id. Prosecutors, agents, or court personal presumably must be more trustworthy based
upon their lack of zealousness. Many might question this conclusion.
158
See Meisner, supra note 105 (referencing the amount of individuals including the U.S.
Attorney and about a dozen FBI agents and DOJ officials allowed to stay in the courtroom
for the secret hearing after reporters, Durkin, and his co-counsel were asked to leave).
159
Id.
160
See id. (explaining who attended the secret meeting).
161
See Glennon, supra note 4, at 93 (suggesting that the public is largely content with the
“tradeoffs between liberty and security”). As just but one possibly telling vignette, the
author was having a casual conversation with a well-educated, wealthy retired
businessperson at a recent party. When the topic of closing Guantanamo came up, and the
author mentioned having been there multiple times and the staggering average per-capita
cost of each detainee, as compared to the costs in the BOP, the gentleman promptly stormed
off suggesting that there was a simple solution to that problem: “Fill Guantanamo with more
prisoners.”
155
156
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what form of government we inherited. 162 The question might also be
phrased as what form our court system must take in a constitutional
democracy that finds itself in the midst of a perpetual emergency in an
increasingly global neoliberal world still operating among competing
issues of classic liberalism and nationalism. 163
It may just well be that the success of the War on Terror’s
demagoguery might be explained by far more difficult problems than
even double government, the lack of collective judicial courage, other
Madisonian checks and balances, or a combination of all of the above. 164
While this explanation is hardly meant to excuse judicial acquiescence of
oversight where oversight is often well due, the fear monger demagogues
might instead be said to be winning based upon the same structural
incentives Professor Glennon so successfully describes as causing such a
centralized government power in the hands of the Trumanites in the first
place.165 For the same reason that one might come to distrust whether the
Attorney General himself or his prosecutors in the field are calling the
shots in domestic national security prosecutions, one might also come to
question whether we have become a nation dedicated to rule by law as
compared to a nation dedicated to the rule of law.” 166 This structural
See id. at 113 (stating there is uncertainty as to what form of government will emerge
from the United States’ experiment with double government); Levinson, supra note 10, at
721, 748 (discussing the public emergencies that are considered “states of exception”).
163
See Glennon, supra note 4, at 113 (forming a judicial take on Glennon’s statement that
questioned what form of government will materialize during changing times). Much to his
credit, however, Judge Posner does not shy away from engaging in this adult conversation
and publicly discussed his views on national security and emergency powers. See generally
RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL
EMERGENCY 35–36 (2006) (pointing out that most judges are not experts when it comes to
national security matters, and this lack of knowledge combined with “the judges’ ideology,
temperament, and intuition about relative risks” might result in the courts deferring to the
executive branch, which generally possesses expertise in national security matters or the
judges might be inclined “to take an adversary stance”). So, too, did former Chief Justice
Rehnquist in his pre-9/11 book on emergency powers. See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST,
ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 224–25 (1998) (discussing judicial restraint in wartime and the need
for courts to pay careful attention to the legal basis for government action curtailing civil
liberty).
164
See Glennon, supra note 4, at 18, 55 (discussing the Madisonian checks and balances
model along with the judiciary not having “a will of its own” in the context of a double
government).
165
See id. at 26–28, 38, 109 (discussing the evolved centralized government perpetuated by
the Trumanites’ along with their “incentive to exaggerate risks and pander to public
fears . . . in order to protect themselves from criticism”).
166
See DYZENHAUS, supra note 6, at 6 (discussing the distinction between “rule by law” and
“the rule of law”). Professor Dyzenhaus defines “rule by law” as the “use of law as a brute
instrument to achieve the ends of those with political power;” as opposed to “the rule of law”
as “the constraints which normative conceptions of the rule of law place on the instrumental
use of law.” Id. Dyzenhaus suggests that recent attempts by academics in the United States
162
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problem may be one larger and more disquieting than any of us care to
admit—particularly for those of us who thought we were devoting our
careers to the, so called, “rule of law.”167
In the academic world of political and legal theorists, the question is
more commonly known as the problem of “the state of exception.” 168
These words owe their origin to the famous Weimar Germany jurist, Carl
Schmitt, who put forth its definition in his 1933 classic, Political Theology.169
Schmitt began the work by bluntly declaring that the “[s]overeign is he
who decides on the exception.”170 Early on, Schmitt notes that there is
little argument in the abstract about sovereignty being the highest power
of a state, but the arguments start over its concrete application. 171 That is,
the question becomes “who decides in a situation of conflict what
constitutes the public interest or interest of the state, public safety and
order, le salut public, and so on.”172 Schmitt’s answer, in rather simplistic
terms for present purposes, is that a situation of extreme peril to the very
existence of the state itself “cannot be circumscribed factually and made
to conform to a preformed law.”173 Thus, it can only be the executive to
which this is entrusted, which leaves little space for judges, except perhaps
solely to keep shoehorning the exceptions into some articulable semblance
of the law.174
The seemingly, very esoteric academic question of sovereignty easily
bleeds into our everyday courtroom world, whether we like it or not, or
intended it or not, when we start throwing around war rhetoric in the
name of national security in a domestic terrorism prosecution as if the
literal existence of the nation is at stake. It is here—over the definition of
“to respond to an allegedly different post-9/11 world turn out to support [Carl] Schmitt’s
view . . . that law cannot govern a state of emergency or exception.” Id. at 19. Dyzenhaus
warns that academics who do this might makes things worse “in much the same way as do
judges who claim to be upholding the rule of law when there is merely rule by law.” Id.
167
See id. at 6 (discussing how the “rule of law” involves “constraints which normative
conceptions of the rule of law place on the instrumental use of law” and that “the choice to
abide by the rule of law a matter of political incentives”).
168
See Levinson, supra note 10, at 722 (“‘[T]he state of exception tends increasingly to
appear as the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary politics,’ it should now
be clear that there is in fact nothing new about the notion of what Hamilton called
‘exigencies’ or Schmitt viewed as ‘exceptions’ or ‘emergencies.’”) (quoting Giorgio
Agamben, the Italian social theorist).
169
SCHMITT, supra note 9, at 1.
170
Id.
171
See id. at 6 (“About an abstract concept there will in general be no argument, least of all
in the history of sovereignty. What is argued about is the concrete application[.]”).
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
See id. (discussing who will make decisions when a country is facing a “situation of
conflict” when the exception is not codified).
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“existential” threats—that seem to have taken us so quickly off the tracks
since 9/11.175 If I read Professor Levinson correctly—along with Schmitt,
Rossiter and Agamben—it is this very complex sovereignty question of
the “state of exception” that requires serious thought and consideration. 176
Like Glennon, Levinson concludes his 2006 Symposium Article for the
Georgia Law Review, entitled Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent
Exception, with a sobering question as to whether it is even possible to have
“an adult conversation” about this issue, the seriousness of which he sets
forth in no uncertain terms:
We are, I believe, at a crossroads in American
constitutional development.
The United States—
justifiably—feels itself threatened by attack, and we have
an administration in power that is both stunningly
ambitious with regard to its view of executive power and
almost contemptuous of the claims of any other
institutions or of the citizenry to engage in independent
constitutional judgment. It is naïve to regard the
Constitution as speaking clearly to the resolution of such
dilemmas. This decision must be our own as to the kind
of political order in which we wish to live. 177
Levinson warns that this discussion of emergency powers or the “state of
exception” is “ultimately a profoundly political one, with law, at least as
traditionally conceived, having relatively little to do with the resolution of

See Daniel R. Williams, After the Gold Rush—Hamdi, 9/11, and the Dark Side of the
Enlightenment, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 341, 355–56 (2007) (claiming the United States faces no
real existential threat).
176
See Levinson, supra note 10, at 722, 748, 751 (discussing the importance of having a
successful conversation regarding constitutional fundamentals when the United States feels
threatened by attack); see also AGAMBEN, supra note 62, at 2 (arguing “the state of exception”
appear to increasingly be a dominant government paradigm in contemporary politics, which
threatens to dramatically change the structure of traditional distinctions between
constitutional forms); ROSSITER, supra note 62, at 288 (“[A] great emergency in the life of a
constitutional democracy will be more easily mastered by the government if dictatorial forms
are to some degree substituted for democratic, and if the executive branch is empowered to
take strong action without an excess of deliberation and compromise.”); SCHMITT, supra note
9, at 6 (explaining the exception can be described as a situation of extreme peril that
endangers the state’s existence). Levinson mentions both authors prominently and each
merits a full read in their own right. See generally Levinson, supra note 10, at 722 (mentioning
both Schmitt and Agamben along with their theory on the state of exception). As noted by
Levinson, in commenting on Rossiter’s distinctly Schmittian overtones, the book itself was
“perhaps telling[], . . . republished after a half-century in 2002 with a cover picture showing
the burning Twin Towers juxtaposed with a seemingly burning Constitution . . . .” Id. at 739.
177
Levinson, supra note 10, at 748.
175
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any truly live controversy.”178 Phrased differently in the context of
discussing the use of torture, Levinson asks: “To what extent should the
President—and those subject to presidential command—view
themselves . . . bound by . . . legal norms, or are such constraints better
defined only as political?”179 Furthermore, Levinson, points out that
Schmitt’s “state of exception” was nothing new at the time in Weimar
Germany, and similar emergency concepts have a lineage to the
dictatorships of ancient Rome, and can find support in the “exigencies”
mentioned in The Federalist by Alexander Hamilton.180 In explaining his
title’s reference to “permanent emergency,” Levinson goes on to suggest
that “in some ways our entire history has featured the presence of
emergencies.”181 Most importantly for our purposes, Levinson points out
that “no single emergency has had the permanence likely to be the case
with the ‘global war on terror.’”182 Eight years later, there can be little
doubt about how permanent this global war remains. 183 Worse yet,
Levinson predicts that even if the global war on terror were to end
tomorrow “there would be more than enough ‘emergencies’ to assure that
the basic tension” of which he speaks would remain. 184
Thus, those deciding the permanence of the state of exception in our
terror war can raise their heads in our courtrooms and alter the rules of
criminal procedure based upon an unquestioned and untested
certification signed by the attorney general, must become part of the adult
conversation Levinson called for over eight years ago. This question, a
Id. at 722, 736.
Id. at 702. In a separate 2004 article, Levinson cites a Schmitt quote to the same effect:
“A normal situation has to be created, and sovereign is he who definitely decides whether
this normal state actually obtains.” Sanford Levinson, Torture in Iraq & The Rule of Law in
America, 133 DAEDALUS 5, 9 (2004). “All law is ‘situation law.’ The sovereign creates and
guarantees the situation as a whole in its totality. He has the monopoly on this ultimate
decision.” Id. at 9. Levinson asserts that “[t]his is precisely the argument being made by
lawyers within the Bush administration.” Id. Here Levinson refers to the controversial Office
of Legal Counsel memos created to justify the used of the infamous Enhanced Interrogation
Techniques. Id. at 6.
180
See Levinson, supra note 10, at 722 (illustrating the history of such concepts).
181
Id. at 737.
182
Id. Levinson interestingly points out a number of earlier nineteenth century wars,
including what he sarcastically describes as wars against “our fellow citizens between 1861
and 1865,” or war against “myriads of American Indians who had the effrontery to resist our
seizure of their homelands.” Id. He also wryly suggests that “[i]f we add to this the years
featuring significant economic downturns or the occurrence of ‘natural disasters’ whose
victims made a claim on the public fisc, I wonder if we would not find that years with
proclaimed ‘emergencies’ outnumber placid years of ostensible normality.” Id.
183
See id. at 737 (“But it should now be clear that in some ways our entire history has
featured the presence of emergencies, even if no single emergency has had the permanence
likely to be the case with the ‘global war on terror.’”).
184
Levinson, supra note 10, at 737.
178
179
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trial lawyer submits, is not one better left in the hands of the academics
and ought seriously be discussed by members of the bar as well as the
judiciary, as the answer from a courtroom perspective appears to be that
there is little doubt, but that we have left this sovereign decision making
in the hands of our Trumanite Double Government—or more precisely
our intelligence agencies.185 This should be every bit as disquieting as both
Glennon and Levinson imply, for the very systemic reasons each
suggests.186 If these agencies can decide the very scope and duration of
the War on Terror, just as they can decide whether a court can choose to
provide defense lawyers with FISA search warrant applications, then we
might do well to think of ourselves as “ruled by law,” instead of living
under a “rule of law.”187 As such, this statement is hardly a semantic
academic difference.188 From the standpoint of Mr. Daoud, it is the
difference between saying to him like Judges Posner and Kanne did: “this
is our law, Kid, tough luck;” as opposed to something like Judge Rovner
said: “sorry, Kid, we judges can’t help you because our hands are tied and
this has to be fixed by someone else.” Identical results, but at least the
later is honest enough to admit the prospect of change.
Likewise, the implications with respect to the role of the judiciary that
Judge Rovner brings to the forefront in Daoud cannot otherwise be
See Glennon, supra note 4, at 30–31 (discussing the decision-making process within the
intelligence agencies).
186
See id. at 96–97 (stating that both authors see the systemic reasons and discuss the
narrowing of the scope of the state’s secrets privilege).
187
See DYZENHAUS, supra note 6, at 2 (noting that courts have power to choose to provide
defense lawyers with FISA warrant applications). The War on Terror finds its origin in The
Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) signed into law by Congress on
September 18, 2001. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(Sept. 18, 2001). The AUMF reads in pertinent part as follows:
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.
Id. For a challenging exercise on the question of sovereignty and the role of the judiciary that
could easily encompass an entirely separate article, one should read the very recent opinion
of Judge Royce C. Lamberth of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
on the issue of whether Taliban detainees could still be held in Guantanamo based upon the
AUMF in light of President Obama’s public pronouncements that the U.S. military
involvement in Afghanistan has ended. Al Warafi v. Obama, 716 F.3d 627, 631–32 (D.C. Cir.
2013).
188
See Defendant’s Reply: Disclosure of FISA, supra note 67 (discussing the recent
disclosures of FISA materials to the courts). The difference according to Dyzenhaus is the
difference between the use of law “as a brute instrument to achieve the ends of those with
political power[,]” as opposed to the “constraints which normative conceptions . . . place on
the instrumental use of law.” DYZENHAUS, supra note 6, at 6.
185
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avoided either.189 The seriousness of the judiciary’s role in “state of
exception” questions are raised quite straightforwardly in Professor
Dyzenhaus’ The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency.190 In a
chapter entitled “Judges and the Politics of the Rule of Law[,]” Dyzenhaus
poses some propositions regarding judicial attempts, as he describes them
much like we have witnessed in Daoud, “to pay lip service to the rule of
law in situations where the rule of law cannot do any work . . . .”191 While
commenting on the dismal British judicial record on wartime
emergencies, but conceding that the courts could not do otherwise in light
of the legislation, Dyzenhaus proposes, what might be said to foreshadow
Judge Rovner’s very candor in Daoud.192 As he puts it, rightly so I would
suggest, “for judges to try to pretend otherwise, to pay lip service to the
rule of law in situations where the rule of law cannot do any work, is likely
to make matters worse by giving to government the façade of the rule of
law without the judges being able to enforce its substance.” 193
See United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479, 482–83, 486, 496 (7th Cir. 2014) (describing that
the federal judicial procedure is not always adversarial and not always completely public
depending on the circumstances).
190
See DYZENHAUS, supra note 6, at 60 (“[T]he state of exception is a claim about discretion
writ large, but it depends on a claim about discretion in ordinary situations.”).
191
Id. at 27. Dyzenhaus, a Sessor of Law and Philosophy at the University of Toronto,
makes these observation in the context of describing the dissent of Lord Atkin’s dissent in
the British House of Lords case of Liversidge v. Anderson. [1942] AC 26 (HL) 212–13. The case
dealt with the question of war-time detention in the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act of
1939, but sounds as if it could well be relevant to our current day Guantanamo cases.
DYZENHAUS, supra note 6, at 23–27.
192
See DYZENHAUS, supra note 6, at 27 (discussing the court’s power and record).
193
Id. For example, Judge Rovner cited and discussed a number of other FISA-related
opinions that contemplated the same issue as that in Daoud regarding the availability of
Franks. Daoud, 755 F.3d at 483. As she noted, these other opinions acknowledge the
importance of a defendant’s right to a Franks hearing, but insisted nonetheless “that
defendants must somehow make the same preliminary showing . . . that Franks would
require in the usual criminal case.” Id. at 490–91; see, e.g., United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d
141, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (expressing sympathy for similar difficulty defendant would have
in attempting to show case was so complex that disclosure of FISA materials is warranted);
United States v. Alwan, 2012 WL 399154, at *9 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 7, 2012) (“Hammadi cannot
offer any proof that statements in the FISA applications were false or were deliberately or
recklessly made because Hammadi has not been able to examine the applications. The Court
is cognizant of the substantial difficulties Hammadi has encountered in trying to assert a
Franks violation.”); United States v. Mehanna, 2011 WL 3652524, at *2 (D. Mass. Aug. 19,
2011) (“The Court recognizes the defendant’s difficulty in making such a preliminary
showing where the defendant has no access to the confidential FISA-related documents
here.”); United States v. Kashmiri, 2010 WL 4705159, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2010) (“The
Court recognizes the frustrating position from which Defendant must argue for a Franks
hearing. Franks provides an important Fourth Amendment safeguard to scrutinize the
underlying basis for probable cause in a search warrant. The requirements to obtain a
hearing, however, are seemingly unattainable by Defendant.”); United States v. Abu-Jihaad,
531 F. Supp. 2d. 299, 311 (D. Conn. 2008) (“Since defense counsel has not had access to the
189
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Dyzenhaus goes on to explain what he describes as “two further and
no less serious concerns.” 194 The first is that this paying of “judicial lip
service to the rule of law in exceptional situations has consequences for
the way judges deal with ordinary situations.” 195 Quite consistent with
our own courtroom experience, Dyzenhaus finds “that judges begin to be
content with less substance in the rule of law in situations which are not
part of any emergency regime, all the while claiming that the rule of law
is well maintained.”196 Going further, Dyzenhaus posits that “the law that
addresses the emergency situation starts to look less exceptional as judges
interpret statutes that deal with ordinary situations in the same
fashion.”197 These concerns, “[a]s a package . . . seem to show that once
the exceptional or emergency situation is normalized . . . the exception
starts to seep into other parts of the law.” 198
Considerably more academic scholarship exists on the issues
surrounding Schmitt’s “state of exception,” that are not within in the
limits of this article, and equally far beyond the expertise of this author. 199
One particular author already mentioned, however, is well worth noting
Government’s submission they—quite understandably—can only speculate about their
contents.”); United States v. Hassoun, 2007 WL 1068127, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2007)
(“Defendant’s admit that their allegations are purely speculative, in that they have not been
given the opportunity to review the classified applications.”); United States v. Mubayyid,
521 F. Supp. 2d 125, 131 (D. Mass. 2007) (“The Court obviously recognizes the difficulty of
defendants’ position: because they do not know what statements were made by the affidavit
in the FISA applications, they cannot make any kind of a showing that those statements were
false. Nonetheless, it does not follow that defendants are entitled automatically to disclosure
of the statements.”).
194
DYZENHAUS, supra note 6, at 27.
195
Id.
196
Id.; see, e.g., Joshua L. Dratel, Section 4 of the Classified Information Procedures Act: The
Growing Threat to the Adversary Process, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 1041, 1045 (2007) (explaining that
courts can issue appropriate protective orders to preserve secrecy). For but one simple, but
noteworthy development, protective orders regarding discovery are now demanded by the
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois in every criminal case. Daoud, 755
F.3d at 481. Judges are so accustomed to these requests that they are granted, as a matter of
course, and most attempts to litigate them are met with judicial disdain as if it were
comparable to civil discovery disputes. Even worse, many prosecutors take the position that
attempting to litigate a motion for a protective order will be viewed as lack of cooperation
should one wish to receive credit for cooperation at sentencing.
197
DYZENHAUS, supra note 6, at 27.
198
Id. This same phenomenon, in the context of U.S. courts post 9/11, has been labeled by
some commentators and practitioners as “seepage.” See Stephen I. Valdeck, Normalizing
Guantánamo, 48 AM CRIM. L. REV. 1547, 1547 (2011) (“Over the past decade, a growing chorus
of courts and commentators has expressed concern that doctrinal accommodations reached
in post-9/11 terrorism cases might spill over or ‘seep’ into more conventional bodies of
jurisprudence.”).
199
See DYZENHAUS, supra note 6, at 34 (explaining that Schmitt’s book discussed the issues
surrounding the “state of exception”).
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again.200 The prolific Italian philosopher and political theorist, Giorgio
Agamben, wrote a very relevant modern sequel to Schmitt’s “state of
exception,” in a 2005 book of the same name.201 Agamben hits on the use
of the metaphor of war by U.S. Presidents in the twentieth century as
being “an integral part of the presidential political vocabulary whenever
decisions considered to be of vital importance are being imposed.” 202
After discussing President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s use of war rhetoric
regarding the use of extraordinary executive powers in a series of statutes
culminating in the 1933 National Recovery Act, Agamben sets his sights
on President Bush’s very same claim to sovereign powers in emergency
situations after 9/11.203
In reference to the U.S. PATRIOT Act’s authorization of indefinite
detention and trial by military commissions, Agamben points out that
“[w]hat is new about President Bush’s order is that it radically erases any
legal status of the individual, thus producing a legally unnamable and
unclassifiable being.”204 As if to predict a recent controversial opinion of
Judge Royce C. Lamberth, of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia declaring that a former Taliban detainee at Guantanamo cannot
be released even after President Obama declared publicly on multiple
occasions that our combat mission had ended in Afghanistan. 205 Agamben
calls the detainees “object[s] of a pure de facto rule, of a detention that is
indefinite not only in the temporal sense but in its very nature as well,
since it is entirely removed from law and from judicial oversight.” 206
Rather shockingly to our American sensibilities, Agamben goes on to state
that “[t]he only thing to which it could possibly be compared is the legal
situation of the Jews in the Nazi Lager [camps], who, along with their
citizenship, had lost every legal identity, but at least retained their identity
as Jews.”207 Even more to the same point, Agamben cites with approval
the American philosopher and gender theorist Judith Butler’s assertion
See id. (“Sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception.”).
See AGAMBEN, supra note 62, at 1.
202
Id. at 21.
203
See id. (addressing the President’s sovereign powers in emergency situations).
204
Id. at 3.
205
See Al Warafi v. Obama, 716 F.3d 627, 632 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (concluding appellant did not
successfully establish that he was a “medical personnel”).
206
AGAMBEN, supra note 62, at 3–4.
207
Id. at 4. See also, NIKOLAS WACHSMANN, KL: A HISTORY OF THE NAZI CONCENTRATION
CAMPS 626 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux eds. 2015) (“There was no direct trail from [early camp]
Dachau in 1933 to Dachau in 1945. The concentration camps could well have taken a
different direction, and in the mid-1930s, it even looked as if they might disappear. They
endured because Nazi leaders, above all Adolf Hitler himself, came to value them as flexible
instruments of lawless repression, which could easily adapt to the changing requirements of
the regime.”).
200
201

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol50/iss2/3

Durkin: Permanent States of Exception: A Two-Tiered System of Criminal Ju

2016]

Permanent States of Exception

463

that “in the detainee at Guantanamo, bare life reaches its maximum
indeterminacy.”208
Agamben goes into considerable detail discussing Carl Schmitt and
ultimately disagrees with him over the place of the “state of exception” in
the law or juridical order of things. First, Agamben points out that “the
state of exception,” in Schmitt’s Political Theology, must also be understood
in the context of Schmitt’s earlier book, Dictatorship.209 Agamben shows
that Schmitt first places “the state of exception” in the context of
dictatorship, and that Schmitt then distinguishes between “commissarial
dictatorship” and “sovereign dictatorship.” 210 Then, Agamben explains
that a commissarial dictatorship “has the aim of defending or restoring
the existing constitution” while a sovereign dictatorship becomes “a
figure of the exception” that reaches its “critical mass or melting point.” 211
Essentially, Agamben parts company with Schmitt’s use of dictatorship
insofar as it becomes a means within the law or structure of a constitution
so as to permit the sovereign to declare a “state of exception” to preserve
the existential survival of the state itself. 212
This issue of constitutional dictatorship, mentioned earlier in our
discussion of Professor Levinson, is not without its supporters and
AGAMBEN, supra note 62, at 4. Professor Judith Butler is the Maxine Elliot Professor in
the Department of Comparative Literature and the Program of Critical Theory at the
University of California, Berkeley and the Hannah Arendt Chair at the European Graduate
School. Department of Comparative Literature, BERKELEY, http://complit.berkeley.edu/?page_
id=168 [http://perma.cc/G59L-QL7E]; Judith Butler-Biography, THE EUROPEAN GRADUATE
SCH., http://www.egs.edu/faculty/judith-butler/biography/ [http://perma.cc/G59LQL7E].
209
See AGAMBEN, supra note 62, at 32 (stating that these two books create a paradigm for a
state of exception that has fully matured into its current state).
210
See id. (describing the difference between “commissarial dictatorship” and “sovereign
dictatorship”).
211
Id.
212
See id. at 50–51 (elaborating on the state of exception). Agamben writes that:
The state of exception is not a dictatorship (whether constitutional or
unconstitutional, commissarial or sovereign) but a space devoid of law,
a zone of anomie in which all legal determinations—and above all the
very distinction between public and private—are deactivated. Thus, all
those theories that seek to annex the state of exception immediately to
the law are false; and so too are both the theory of necessity as the
originary source of law and the theory that sees the state of exception as
the exercise of a state’s right to its own defense or as the restoration of
an originary pleromatic state of the law (“full powers”). But fallacious
too are those theories, like Schmitt’s, that seek to inscribe the state of
exception indirectly within a juridical context by grounding it in the
division between norms of law and norms of the realization of law,
between constituent power and constituted power, between norm and
decision.
Id.
208
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appears to have gained considerable traction in American legal and
political consciousness around the time of the creation of the National
Security Act of 1947—not coincidentally, at the very same time the United
States was taking over the role of hegemon with its development of the
Atomic Bomb.213 Much of the credit goes to the Cornell historian and
political scientist, Clinton L. Rossiter. In his 1949 classic, appropriately
entitled Constitutional Dictatorship, Professor Rossiter does not shy away
or apologize for the fact that the United States has the bomb and will use
it to become the most powerful nation on earth. 214 In his straightforward
conclusion after an exhaustive study of the use of emergency powers
throughout history by the United States, Great Britain, France, and the
German Weimar Republic of 1919 to 1933: “From this day forward, we
must cease wasting our energies in discussing whether the government of
the United States is going to be powerful or not.” 215 The reason this is such
an easy choice, says Rossiter with no holds barred, is because if the United
States is not powerful, “we are going to be obliterated.” 216 Thus, since we
have no choice other than obliteration, Rossiter says the country’s only
problem is to “make that power effective and responsible, to make any
future dictatorship a constitutional one.” 217 Not being bashful, Rossiter
finally and proudly concludes that “[n]o sacrifice is too great for our
democracy, least of all the temporary sacrifice of democracy itself.” 218
It is little wonder then, as was mentioned early by Professor Levinson,
that Rossiter’s book enjoyed a renaissance when it was republished in 2002
with a cover juxtaposing the burning Twin Towers and the
Constitution.219 Before we take comfort in Rossiter that all is well, and we
See ROSSITER, supra note 62, at 314 (describing how the Bomb morphed the United States
into a powerful positive state).
214
See id. (stating that the United States will become more powerful or it will become
obliterated).
215
Id. There is little that Rossiter says that is not straightforward, blunt, and hinting at a
great deal of faith in democracy and the exceptionalism of the United States. Rossiter begins
the book by rephrasing President Lincoln’s question regarding his suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus at the outset of the Civil War for the modern, post-World War II total war,
nuclear world in which he found himself after returning from the Pacific where he had
served as a Navy officer: “Can a democracy fight a successful total war and still be a
democracy when the war is over?” Id. at 3. Lincoln had famously asked in July of 1861: “Is
there in all republics this inherent and fatal weakness? Must a government of necessity be
too strong for the liberties of its people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?” Id.
Rossiter unabashedly answers his modern version of Lincoln’s question in the affirmative as
being borne out by the “incontestable facts of history.” Id.
216
ROSSITER, supra note 62, at 314.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
See Levinson, supra note 10, at 739 (describing the cover of the book as a picture with
the Twin Towers next to a burning Constitution).
213
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are on solid constitutional footing, it is important to pay attention to
eleven specific maxims Rossiter mandates for a successful constitutional
dictatorship.220 If I read them correctly, at a minimum we are at serious
risk of being found in violation of a majority of the maxims. Two maxims
require time limitations—if not a specific termination date—one
specifically forbids the measures to be permanent in character or effect;
and another requires that the decision to create a dictatorship never be
placed in the hands of the people who will constitute the dictator. 221 The
latter concern dovetails exactly into the question of sovereignty at risk in
a double government.222 Who is it, or in whose hands, we have
surrendered our sovereignty, needs desperately to be discussed,
presuming as all appearances indicate, that we continue to choose to live
in the global terror war’s apparently permanent “state of exception.” 223
Rossiter’s discussion necessarily includes a review of his other
warnings, especially for our purposes, his very first rule: “No general
regime or particular institution of constitutional dictatorship should be
initiated unless it is necessary or even indispensable to the preservation of
the state and its constitutional order.”224 While I have strong doubts about
See ROSSITER, supra note 62, at 298–306 (listing eleven maxims regarding constitutional
dictatorships).
221
See id. at 299, 300, 303, 306 (stating that the men constituting a dictatorship should never
decide to create one; measures should never be permanent; a dictatorship should not last
beyond its termination; and dictatorships should not be created without instructions for its
termination).
222
See Book Note, National Security and Double Government, 47 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
447, 447 (reviewing MICHAEL J. GLENNON, NATIONAL SECURITY AND DOUBLE GOVERNMENT
(2015)) (defining “double government” as a conglomerate of two institutions: the
“Madisonian” government that consists of three branches of government and the
“Trumanite” network of contractors and agents that work for government agencies and
divisions).
223
See supra Part II (analyzing the idea that the War on Terror does not have an end in
sight).
224
ROSSITER, supra note 62, at 298. The remaining maxims read in their entirety are as
follows: (2) “[T]he decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should never be in the
hands of the man or men who will constitute the dictator[;]” (3) “[n]o government should
initiate a constitutional dictatorship without making specific provision for its termination[;]”
(4) “all uses of emergency powers and all readjustments in the organization of the
government should be effected in pursuit of constitutional or legal requirements[;]” (5) “no
dictatorial institution should be adopted, no right invaded, no regular procedure altered any
more than is absolutely necessary for the conquest of the particular crisis[;]” (6) “[t]he
measure adopted in the prosecution of constitutional dictatorship should never be
permanent in character or effect[;]” (7) “[t]he dictatorship should be carried on by persons
representative of every part of the citizenry interested in the defense of the existing
constitutional order[;]” (8) “[u]ltimate responsibility should be maintained for every action
taken under a constitutional dictatorship[;]” (9) “[t]he decision to terminate a constitutional
dictatorship, like the decision to institute one, should never be in the hands of the man or
men who constitute the dictator[;]” (10) “[n]o constitutional dictatorship should extend
220
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how indispensable the need was for the enormity of our post 9/11
response, I could live with giving the intelligence community the benefit
of the doubt that the threat of terrorism is as enormous as our response
indicates.225
What seems totally wrong however, is leaving the
implementation of it all in the hands of those same people as Rossiter
warns.226
Agamben arrives at the very same conclusion as Rossiter with respect
to placing the juridical norm and the power to suspend it in the same
hands.227 While Agamben approaches it from a bit different and more
complex philosophical angle, his warning is equally, if not more ominous
to our discussion. 228 Agamben minces no words in telling us: “[W]hen
they tend to coincide in a single person, when the state of exception, in
which they are bound and blurred together, becomes the rule, then the
juridico-political system transforms itself into a killing machine.” 229
V. CONCLUSION
After thirteen years and counting, there does not seem to be a realistic
end in sight to our global war on terror and the changes it has brought and
continues to bring to our legal system, as the recent Paris attacks while this

beyond the termination of the crisis for which it was instituted[;]” (11) “the termination of
the crisis must be followed by as complete a return as possible to the political and
governmental conditions existing prior to the initiation of the constitutional dictatorship.”
Id. at 299–300, 302–06.
225
See supra Part II (describing the intelligence community’s response to terrorism
following the 9/11 attack).
226
See ROSSITER, supra note 62, at 299 (stating that the decision to create a dictatorship
should not be placed in the hands of the people who are going to constitute the dictatorship).
227
See AGAMBEN, supra note 62, at 86 (concluding that a state of exception can function
properly if the juridical norm and the power to suspend it remain correlated but distinct).
228
See id. (displaying Agamben’s discussion of the state of exception). Agamben puts it
this way:
The state of exception is the device that must ultimately articulate and
hold together the two aspects of the juridico-political machine by
instituting a threshold of undecidability between anomie and nomos,
between life and law, between auctoritas and potestas. It is founded on
the essential fiction according to which anomie (in the form of auctoritas,
living law, or the force of law) is still related to the juridical order and
the power to suspend the norm has an immediate hold on life. As long
as the two elements remain correlated yet conceptually, temporally, and
subjectively distinct (as in republican Rome’s contrast between the
Senate and the people, or in medieval Europe’s contrast between
spiritual and temporal powers) their dialectic—though founded on a
fiction—can nevertheless function in some way.
Id.
229
Id.
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Article was going to print sadly confirm.230 Thus, the urgency of Professor
Levinson’s request for an adult conversation seems as every bit, if not
more important today than it was when he called for it in 2006, and we
have Valparaiso University to thank for renewing that very important
conversation. Now some eight years later, if nothing else, it is certainly
time to ask for lawyers outside of academia to join the conversation.
Perhaps then we might get more judges to join us as well, as the stakes are
certainly worth it—double government or not, two-tiered systems or not.
Regardless of the ultimate outcome of the conversation, one thing is for
sure, I would think—that is, I doubt very much that any of us will choose
to leave our legal system in the hands of our intelligence agencies.

Adam Nossiter, Paris Attacks Spur Emergency Edict and Intense Policing in France, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/24/world/europe/in-francesome-see-the-police-security-net-as-too-harsh-paris-attacks.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
7ULY-ZYQS] (“All over France, from Toulouse in the south to Paris and beyond, the police
have been breaking down doors, conducting searched without warrants, aggressively
questioning residents, hauling suspects to police stations and putting others under house
arrest. The extraordinary steps are now perfectly legal under the state of emergency decreed
by the government after the attacked on [November] 13 in Paris that left 130 dead—a rare
kind of mobilization that will continue.”).
230
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